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NINE-HEADED CAESAR: THE
SUPREME COURT'S THUMBS-UP
APPROACH TO THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL
The requirement that [the Court's holdings make sense] is
the only thing thatprevents this Courtfrom being some sort
of nine-headed Caesar,giving thumbs-up or thumbs-down to
whatever outcome, case by case, suits or offends its collective
fancy.'
-Justice Antonin Scalia
INTRODUCTION
In response to the Supreme Court's most recent episode in the
continually changing Miranda doctrine, Justice Scalia compared the
Court to an authoritarian ruler. That case, Dickerson v. United
States,2 declared a federal statute3 unconstitutional and affirmed
Miranda v. Arizona4 by way of elevating Miranda to a constitutional
rule. This despite the fact that, in the thirty-four years following
Miranda, numerous cases have undermined Miranda's rationale by
finding Miranda violations without finding constitutional violations. 5
Faced with this situation, where Miranda could not be reconciled with
its progeny, Justice Scalia could not join the Court in deciding "that
incoherence is [a] lesser evir' than upholding a democratically enacted federal statute and harmonizing the Miranda doctrine.6 In the
aftermath of Dickerson, the Mirandadoctrine makes less sense than it
did before.
The Miranda doctrine does not comer the market on doctrinal
incoherence. Saenz v. Roe7 is the latest installment in the Court's
highly confused right-to-travel jurisprudence. Over the last 130
years, the Court has consistently struck down state statutes infringing

1 Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2342 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2

120 S. Ct. 2326 (2900).

3 See 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994) (declaring all voluntary statements admissible in federal

court).

4 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding, as a precondition to admissibility, that Miranda warnings
must be read to a suspect before any incriminating statement given in custodial interrogation).
s See Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2340-42 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing post-Miranda
cases that carved out exceptions to Miranda).
d. at2343.
7 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
6
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the right to travel. Although the Court has stated numerous times that
the "right finds no explicit mention in the Constitution,, 8 the Constitution's omission of the term "travel" has not posed such a tremendous intellectual challenge that the right has not received protection.
The challenge has been great enough, however, that the Court has
continually equivocated as to the textual source for the right.
Throughout the Court's right-to-travel jurisprudence, various Justices
have embraced no less than ten different clauses of the Constitution,
each with its own distinct method of analysis, as protecting the right
to travel. In fact, some Justices have, at times, implied that the search
for a textual source is superfluous. 9 Such continuous equivocation by
the Court has amounted to a dereliction of its duty to properly interpret the Constitution. 0
Out of this morass of the right to travel, constitutional clauses,
and shifting justifications came Saenz v. Roe. Saenz involved a California statute limiting welfare benefits to residents of less than twelve
months. As the Court attempted to align all of its Commerce Clause
jurisprudence in United States v. Lopez," Justice Stevens similarly
attempted in Saenz concerning the right-to-travel cases. The Court
held that the right to travel is composed of three separate aspects,
each protected by a different constitutional theory or clause. Therefore, Saenz represents the Court's first thorough attempt to reconcile
the right to travel with the text of the Constitution. In numerous preceding cases, the Court had simply stated that the right exists with
little or no explanation of why the Constitution protects the right to
travel. What is more surprising is that the Court's conclusory protection of the right has not been uniform-that is, many different clauses
have been advanced as the source of the right. Unfortunately, the
Saenz Court was unable or unwilling to fully deal with the right to
travel and the Constitution's text. Instead, the Court muddled the already mirky waters of right-to-travel jurisprudence.
This Note examines the right to travel as the Supreme Court has
interpreted it and argues that the privileges and immunities clauses of
8 E.g., Shapiro v.Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,630 (1969).
9 See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 66 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[T]he frequent attempts to assign the right to travel some textual source in the Constitution seem... to
have proved both inconclusive and unnecessary."). Judge Bork is highly critical of such judicial
nonchalance regarding the text of the Constitution:
The only accountability these "robed masters" should have is to the meaning of the
Constitution, a meaning discerned by study of its text, structure, and history. Ifjustices ignore those constraints, as many of them do, they govern according to their
own tastes, and we have no way of resisting or altering the ukases they hand down..
. The rule of judges without any plausible reference to the Constitution can
hardly be called legitimate in a nation that was designed to be basically democratic.
Robert H. Bork, Here Come the Judges,NAT. REV., Aug. 14, 2000, at 37, 37.
'0 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is, emphatically, the
province and duty of the judicial department, to say what the law is.").
" 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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the Comity Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment protect an overarching right to travel. Section I traces the Court's right-to-travel jurisprudence and the evolution of that right through the Court's decision in Saenz. Section II examines and rejects a variety of constitutional provisions that have been put forward as sources of the right to
travel. Section III examines the origins and meaning of the Comity
Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and argues that these clauses protect the right to travel.
Additionally, Section III offers a test for determining whether the
right to travel has been abridged. Finally, this Note concludes by
urging the Supreme Court to reexamine its right-to-travel jurisprudence. The Court must place the right within the appropriate constitutional provisions and fashion an analysis in conformity with those
provisions. Until that time, the Court will continue as a nine-headed
Caesar, employing convoluted analyses to strike down state laws as
abridgements of the right to travel.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S RIGHT-TO-TRAVEL JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Right Recognized
Initially, the Supreme Court viewed the right to travel as an im12
plied general principle of the Constitution. In Crandall v. Nevada,
the Court passed judgment on the constitutionality of a state tax upon
13
persons leaving or passing through Nevada by public conveyance.
In declaring the Nevada law unconstitutional, Justice Miller, writing
for the Court, was less than clear as to whether the law abridged congressional power to regulate commerce.1 4 The Court was equally
equivocal on whether the 15state had violated Article I, section 10 by
laying a duty on an export.
Instead of relying on any specific constitutional language, the
CrandallCourt relied on the general principles of the Constitution to
strike down the Nevada law. Justice Miller characterized the people
of the United States as "one nation... [with] a government in which
all of them are deeply interested."1 6 As one nation, each citizen

12

73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).

13

See id.

See id4 at 41-43 ("Inasmuch, therefore, as the tax does not itself institute any regulation
of commerce of a national character, or which has a uniform operation over the whole country,
it is not easy to maintain.., that it violates the [Commerce] clause .... ").
15 See id. at 40-41 ("The application of this provision of the Constitution
to the proposition which we have stated in regard to the citizen, is still less satisfactory than it would be to the
case of foreigners migrating to the United States."). See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2
("No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or
Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws...
16 Crandall,73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 43.
14
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has the right to come to the seat of government to assert any
claim he may have upon that government, or to transact any
business he may have with it. To seek its protection, to share
its offices, to engage in administering its functions. [Each]
has a right to free access to its sea-ports .. .to the subtreasuries, the land offices, the17revenue offices, and the courts
of justice in the several States.
Justice Miller emphasized, as the final declaration of a general principle to travel, that the right to engage in the aforementioned activities
was "independent of the'1will
of any State over whose soil he must
8
pass in the exercise of it."
Similarly, the Court struck down a California statute limiting individuals' right to cross state lines in Edwards v. California.9 California had imposed a criminal penalty for knowingly bringing or assisting an indigent non-resident person into the state.20 With little
discussion, the Court held that the prohibition was not within the police powers of the state and that it posed an unconstitutional barrier to
interstate commerce. 21 In support of this conclusion, the Court quoted
Justice Cardozo: "'The Constitution was framed under the dominion
of a political philosophy less parochial in range. It was framed upon
the theory that the peoples of the several States must sink or swim
together, and that in
22 the long run prosperity and salvation are in union
and not division."
In separate concurring opinions, Justices Douglas and Jackson
expressed disdain for the Court's reliance on the Commerce Clause,
arguing that the Commerce Clause relates only to goods, not persons,
and that the right to move freely from state to state is "fundamental. 2 3 Citing Crandall, Justice Douglas contended that the right to
move freely throughout the nation was an implied right of national
citizenship, emphasizing that the right's implied nature "did not make
it any the less 'guaranteed' by the Constitution." 24 Justice Jackson
argued that the right was incident to a person's citizenship under the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 25
17 Id. at 44.
18 Id.
'9 314U.S. 160 (1941).
20 See id. at 165-66.

21
22

See id. at 172-73.
Id. at 173-74 (quoting Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511,523 (1935)).

23
24

See id. at 177 (Douglas, J., concurring); id at 182 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Id. at 178.

25 See id. at 182 (Jackson. J.,
concurring). The Fourteenth Amendment states, in relevant
part: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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The Court reasserted the fundamental nature of the right to travel
in United States v. Guest.26 Guest involved a private conspiracy to
prevent black citizens from using the state highways. The Court held
that the district court had erred in dismissing part of the indictment, as
it alleged that the right to travel to use highway facilities had been
infringed. 27 Justice Stewart, writing for the. Court, stated that "[t]he
constitutional right to travel from one State to another, and necessarily to use the highways and other instrumentalities of interstate commerce in doing so, occupies a position fundamental to the concept of
our Federal Union." 28 Justice Stewart relied on Crandall and Edwards to support the Court's protection of a right unmentioned in the
Constitution, arguing that the "right finds no explicit mention in the
Constitution. The reason, it has been suggested, is that a right so
elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created." 29
Thus, by 1966, the Court had confronted the fundamental problem with a "constitutional" right to travel-namely, that it is nowhere
mentioned in the Constitution. The Court solved this problem by declaring the right fundamental, finding that the Constitution's framers
had implied the right. The inadequacy of this solution was soon demonstrated when the Court altered its approach to the right to travel.
B. The Right Reevaluated
Shortly after Guest, the Court altered its approach to the right to
travel while simultaneously reaffirming the right's fundamental nature. Shapiro v. Thompson 0 involved several states' complete denial
of welfare assistance to persons residing in those states for less than
one year. In determining what constitutional right was implicated by
the denials, Justice Brennan focused on the distinction the statutes
drew between two types of residents, those of more than one year and
those of less. 31 Such distinctions, he reasoned, denied equal protec32
tion of the laws by creating a "chilling effect on the right to travel."
Justice Brennan refrained from finding a textual source for the right to
travel and quoted Guest to the effect that the right was necessarily
implied.33 Despite the lack of a textual source for the right and the
right's fundamental nature, the Court altered its right-to-travel analysis. The Court analyzed the statutes under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This analysis, however, did
26 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
27 See id. at 757.

281d.
29 Id. at758.

'0 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
"' See id.
at 627.
32

Id.at623.

33 See supratext accompanying note 28.

302
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not employ traditional equal protection analysis, which focuses on
classifications created by statutes.34 Instead, the Court applied 35the
fundamental rights analysis first espoused in Skinner v. Oklahoma.
This fundamental rights analysis, a relatively new addition to the
36
Court's equal protection jurisprudence, consists of three questions.
First, is there a fundamental right at issue? Second, does the state law
penalize the exercise of that fundamental right? Third, does the state
have a compelling interest in penalizing the exercise of the fundamental right? If the first two questions are answered affirmatively,
but the answer to the third question is negative, the statute must be
deemed unconstitutional.
In answering these questions, the Court struck down the statutes
at issue in Shapiro. In addressing the first question, Justice Brennan
concluded that the Court's precedent had consistently held that the
right to travel is fundamental, notwithstanding the Constitution's silence on the issue.37 By denying welfare assistance to new residents,
the statutes served to penalize those who were considering exercising
the right or who had done so in the previous twelve months. 38 At this
point, precedent dictated that the Court declare the statutes unconstitutional. Fundamental rights analysis, however, allows states to justify the penalty as long as the penalty served a compelling interest.39
Several justifications were offered for the challenged statutes, namely
that they: (1) served as a protective device to preserve the fiscal integrity of the public assistance program; (2) facilitated efficient welfare
budget planning; (3) provided an objective test of residency; (4) protected against recipients who received benefits from more than one
state; and (5) encouraged new residents to enter the job market. 4° The
Court dismissed all of the justifications as unfounded or illegitimate,
essentially because the need for subsistence welfare was more important. The Court held that public assistance benefits, because they
implicate the very means to subsist, were a right and not merely a
34 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the incarceration
and dispossession of all persons of Japanese ancestry on the West Coast).
3- 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding that the right to procreate was fundamental and therefore
a state statute authorizing the sterilization of certain criminals was unconstitutional).
36

See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,

CONSTITTIrONAL LAW:

PRINCIPLES AND

POLICIES 640-44 (1997) (analyzing each of the three questions raised by fundamental rights
analysis).
37 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969) (collecting cases consistent with
this principle).
38 See id. at 629 (noting statute's purpose of "inhibiting migration of needy persons into
the State is constitutionally impermissible").
39 See id. at 627. This compelling governmental interest test is otherwise known as strict
scrutiny. The Shapiro Court failed to address the rationale for the strict scrutiny test other than
by finding that the right affected was fundamental. See Stewart Abercrombie Baker, Comment,
A Strict Scrutiny of the Right to Travel, 22 UCLA L. REv. 1129, 1136 (1975) ("The Court did
not reveal why this waiting period invoked strict scrutiny.").
4o See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 627-34.
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privilege.4 1 In the end, statutes penalizing the right could not be justified because the right was fundamental.
In his dissent, Justice Harlan declared this new fundamental
rights branch of the Equal Protection Clause "particularly unfortunate
and unnecessary." 42 The approach was untenable because extending
protection to rights not enumerated in the Constitution threatened to
transform the Court into a "super-legislature.' 43 Furthermore, because fundamental rights are protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, resort to the Equal Protection Clause is
unnecessary. 44 Justice Harlan's criticism was prescient because, for
some time following, the Court's application of fundamental rights
analysis would "swallow" the standard equal protection rule with regards to the right to travel.
The analysis began to swallow not only the standard equal protection rule, but the entire Constitution in Dunn v. Blumstein.45 In
Dunn, the Court was faced with a Tennessee state law establishing a
durational residency requirement for voting. While the Fifteenth
Amendment concerns the right to vote, the Amendment's protection
is limited to prohibiting classifications based on race, color, or previous condition of servitude, and is not implicated by a simple durational residency requirement. 6 Therefore, the Court employed a fundamental rights analysis to examine the law. The Court summarily
held that the opportunity to vote and the right to travel were both fundamental rights. 47 Since the classification distinguished between new
and old residents, it denied individuals the opportunity to vote, and
thereby penalized the right to travel.48 The State argued that there
was no showing that the residency requirement deterred the right to
travel. 49 Speaking for the Court, Justice Marshall rebuffed the State's
argument by claiming that Shapiro did not rest upon a finding of ac-

41 See iaU at 627.
42 Id. at 661 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
43 Id. Cf Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,482 (1965) ("We do not sit as a superlegislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems,
business affairs, or social conditions."); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 506 (1961) ("'It never
was the thought that... a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry
as to the constitutionality of the legislative act."') (quoting Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v.
Wellman, 143 U.S. 339,344-45 (1957)).
44 See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 661-62 (noting the Court's tendency to characterize activities
as fundamental and hold them to a stricter standard).
41 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
46 See U.S. CONSr. amend. XV ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.").
47 See Dunn, 405 U.S. at 335 (holding that both "the opportunity to vote" and "recent
interstate travel" can only be restricted when justified by a compelling state interest).
48 See id. at 334-35.
4. See id. at 339.
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tual deterrence. 50 Rather, Shapiro stood for the proposition that "any
classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right [to
travel]",5 1 would require the state to justify the classification by a
compelling governmental interest. 52 Hence, the statute would be declared unconstitutional unless Tennessee offered a compelling governmental interest for penalizing the right.
Tennessee asserted two justifications for its durational residency
requirement, namely to ensure purity of the ballot box and to ensure
that voters were knowledgeable regarding their community.5 3 The
Court found neither justification persuasive. 54 Justice Marshall reasoned that voter registration accompanied by an oath of allegiance
would be sufficient to insure the purity of the ballot box.55 As to ensuring knowledgeable voters, Justice Marshall reasoned that the
State's attempt to create a common interest in the community was
impermissible because a difference of opinion was not a legitimate
basis for excluding voters.5 6 Thus, Tennessee's durational residency
requirement was an unconstitutional penalty of the right to travel.
The Court continued its expansive protection of the right to
travel in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County.57 In that case, an
Arizona statute required residents to live in a county for one year before becoming eligible for free non-emergency hospitalization or
medical care.5 The Court held that the right to receive free medical
care was a basic life necessity and therefore fundamental. 59 Because
temporarily withholding the right to medical care penalized the right
to travel, Arizona was required to delineate a compelling governmental interest served by the statute.60
In previous cases, the Court had rejected, as either unfounded or
illegitimate, the justifications being asserted by Arizona. Edwards
held that inhibiting indigent immigration was impermissible. 61 Dunn
declared durational residency requirements overinclusive when employed as convenient tests for bona fide residency. 62 Finally, Shapiro
rejected the justifications of protecting the fiscal integrity of public
50 See id.
51 Il at 339-40 (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969)).
52

See id.

51 See id. at 345-46.
54 See id. at 346, 358 (dismissing the requirement as unnecessary to achieve either justifi-

cation).
55 See id. at 346.

See id. at 355.
5 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
5 See id. at 252-53.
59 See id. at 259 ("[G]overnmental privileges or benefits necessary to basic sustenance
have ... greater constitutional significance.").
60 See id. at 258-59.
61 See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 176 (1941).
62 See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 358 (1972).
56
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assistance programs, preventing fraud, and rewarding contributions
made by longtime residents.63
In his dissent in Memorial Hospital,Justice Rehnquist stated that
the Court's characterization of the case as a penalty on the right to
travel was preposterous. 64 He argued that there was no constitutional
right to non-emergency medical care and hospitalization-the real
issue in the case. Instead, the Court, by claiming that a person's
right to travel is burdened by such legislation, required that states who
66
extend services to anyone must extend those services to everyone.
This right--"insuring new residents the same right to vital government benefits and privileges in the States to which they migrate as are
enjoyed by other residents"-did not have a textual basis in the Constitution.6 Instead, the Court simply asserted that "[t]he right of interstate travel
has repeatedly been recognized as a basic constitutional
68
freedom."
C. The Right Revised
By 1974, it seemed as though no state law distinguishing between new and old residents could satisfy the Court's exacting analysis regarding the right to travel. Nevertheless, the post-Memorial
Hospital Court appeared to treat such distinctions more tolerantly,
thereby allowing some state restrictions to stand. This appearance,
however, proved to be deceiving in that right-to-travel analysis continued to nullify many state laws. Regardless, the post-Memorial
Hospital cases demonstrated three changes in the Court's analysis.
First, the Court lowered its standard of review from strict scrutiny to
mere rationality, thus allowing a few laws to survive. Second and
thereafter, the Court's application of mere rationality became erratic.
Third, some members of the Court reinvigorated the search for a textual source of the right.
Sosna v. Iowa69 first signaled the Court's changing analysis. In
Sosna, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, upheld a one-year
Iowa residency requirement before residents could file for divorce.
Under the Shapiro line of cases, the statue would have been declared
unconstitutional.70 Instead, Rehnquist reasoned that domestic rela-

63
64

See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,634-35 (1969).
See Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 283-84 (1974) (Rehnquist,

J., dissenting).
6 See id. at 282-83.
6 See id. at 278.
67 Il at 280.
68 Id at 254.
69 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
70 Justice Marshall said as much in his dissent: "The Court omits altogether what should
be the first inquiry: whether the right to obtain a divorce is of sufficient importance that its
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tions had always been within the exclusive province of state governments and that the requirements rearding domestic relations were
beyond the Court's scope of inquiry.
Not only did the Court defer to the Iowa legislature's exclusive
domain over domestic relations, the Court preferred not to characterize the statute as a penalty on the right to travel. In analyzing the
right-to-travel precedents, Justice Rehnquist declared that "none of
those cases intimated that the states might never impose durational
residency requirements, and such a proposition was in fact expressly
disclaimed." ' Because the waiting period only delayed access to the
73
courts, which was seen as a benefit rather than a fundamental right,
the statute could be justified by a showing of mere rationality.
Iowa's three justifications were all accepted by the Court, including a justification the Court had previously determined illegitimate. First, delaying the benefit kept Iowa from intermeddling in
matters in which another state had a paramount interest. 74 Second,
delaying the benefit minimized the susceptibility of Iowa's divorce
proceedings to collateral attack.75 Third, the delay served budgetary
considerations and administrative convenience. 76 The Court's acceptance of budgetary concern and administrative ease signaled the
Court's newfound toleration of state statutes affecting the right to
travel and a possible rejection of Shapiro's fundamental rights analysis. Sosna, however, would prove to be the exception to the old rightto-travel rule.
In Sosna, the Court had signaled a departure from Shapiro and a
newfound interest in entertaining state justifications for laws distinguishing between residents. The Court lowered the standard of review from the seemingly insurmountable "compelling state interest"
test to mere rationality. In Zobel v. Williams,7 7 the Court affirmed the
departure but showed that the application of mere rationality would
be erratic. Additionally, one member of the Court attempted to place
the right to travel within the text of the Constitution.78
The state law struck down in Zobel distributed income to Alaska
residents based upon their length of residency. The statute was distinguishable from those previously confronted by the Court in three
denial to recent immigrants constitutes a penalty on interstate travel. In my view, it clearly
meets that standard." Id. at 419 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
71 See id. at 404 ( "[Sitatutory regulation of domestic relations [is] an area that has long
been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the states.").
72 Id. at406.
73 See id.
74 See id. at 407.
75 See i.
76 See id. at 408.
77 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
78 See id. at 73 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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respects. First, instead of creating two classes of residents, new and
old, the Alaska statute created numerous classes by distributing the
benefit according to the number of years a person had been an Alaska
resident. Second, newer residents could never achieve equal status
with older residents but would always be classified as newer residents
because the level of benefits was graduated according to years of
residency. Third, the statute did not penalize travel, in that it benefited those who had traveled earlier or had never traveled at all by
increasing their yearly benefit.
The Court declared the law unconstitutional even though the
third distinguishing factor-that the statute did not penalize the right
to travel-probably would have allowed the statute to withstand mere
rationality scrutiny under Sosna. Instead, Chief Justice Burger began
the Court's analysis by stating, "[wihen a state distributes benefits
unequally, the distinctions it makes are subject to scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."79 Chief Justice Burger reasoned that because the unequal benefits are based on
distinctions made between newcomers and longer-term residents, the
right to travel is penalized. 80 Even though the Court's opinion mentioned the right to travel only in a footnote, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion stated that the Court's analysis was based
on the
81
abridgement of the right to "interstate travel or migration."
Under mere rationality, Alaska only needed to show that the distinctions were rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. Alaska
put forth three justifications: (1) the distinction created a financial
incentive for existing residents to remain and for non-residents to become residents; (2) the distinction was based on the prudent financial
management of the fund responsible for distributing the benefit; and
(3) benefits were apportioned in accordance with past contributions
made during the years of residency.8 2 The Court held that the first
two justifications were not rationally related to any governmental objective since they were belied by the fact that persons residing in the
state twenty-one years prior to the statute's enactment were given
higher benefits.83 Until the statute went into effect, those residents
had no incentive to remain and prudent management was not a factor.
The third justification, apportioning benefits to ast contributions, had
already been rejected by the Court in Shapiro. In this context, the
Chief Justice asked: "Could states impose different taxes based on
length of residence? Alaska's reasoning could open the door to state
79 Id.at 60.

soSee id.
at 60 n.6.

81 Id. at 72 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
2 See id. at 61.

'3See id.
at 61-62.

84 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 623-33 (1969).
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apportionment of other
rights, benefits, and services according to
85
length of residency.
Although Chief Justice Burger stated that Alaska needed to show
mere rationality to justify the distinctions, the application of the standard appeared more stringent. For example, creating an incentive to
remain a resident is rationally related to the distinction between those
who were residents in 1959 and those who became residents thereafter. Alaska made the statute retroactive giving larger benefits to those
who were residents in 1959, the first year of Alaska's statehood.8 6
Granting larger benefits to those residing in the state at the time of
and since its admission to the Union is more rationally related to their
remaining residents than lumping residents from 1959 with residents
as of 1980, the year of the statute's enactment. Lumping prestatehood residents together with new residents twenty-one years later
disregards the entire history of the state and of those who helped
Alaska become a state.
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor criticized the Court's
application of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the statute. She argued that "[t]he Court's task.., should be
(1) to articulate this constitutional principle, explaining its textual
sources and (2) to test the strength of Alaska's objective against the
constitutional imperative. 8 7 Attempting to articulate the constitutional principle, Justice O'Connor characterized the Alaska statute as
denying newly arrived Alaska residents the same privileges granted to
longer-term residents.88 Therefore, the statute implicated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, section 2 of the Constitution-the Comity Clause.89 Justice O'Connor maintained that this
textual source should be the basis for all right-to-travel claims. 90
The Comity Clause "'insure[s] to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same privileges which the citizens of State B
enjoy."' 91 Under this clause, the Court engages in a three-part test.
First, the Court will inquire into whether the "nonresident sought to
engage in an essential activity or exercise a basic right. 9 2 Second,
the state statute must be aimed at eradicating a particular source of

85 Zobel, 457 U.S. at 64 (1982).
6 See id. at 57.
87 Id. at 73 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

" See id.
89 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.").
90 See Zobel, 457 U.S. at 74 (O'Connor, J.,concurring) ("[This analysis supplies a
needed foundation for many of the 'right to travel' claims discussed in the Court's prior opinions.").
91 Id. at 74 (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948)).
92 Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 387 (1978).
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evil posed by the nonresident's activity in the state.93 Third, the evil
must be substantially related to the discrimination practiced against
the nonresident.94
Applying this test to Alaska's statute, Justice O'Connor deemed
the Alaska statute unconstitutional. First, the right at issue was fundamental, the right of nonresidents to choose to settle in Alaska.95
Second, the statute was not aimed at nonresidents as a source of evil;
rather, the statute was aimed at encouraging nonresidents to become
new residents and remain. 96 Third, because the statute was not aimed
at a source of evil, there was no substantial relationship between the
statute and the discrimination. 9 Therefore, O'Connor concurred in
the judgment because she believed that the statute violated the Comity Clause rather than the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Justice O'Connor's attempt to place the right to travel within the text
of the Constitution was not joined by any other members of the Court.
Justice Rehnquist, the only other member of the Court who did not
join Zobel's rationale, dissented, arguing that the Alaska statute
passed mere rationality under the Equal Protection Clause. Additionally, he argued that the Comity Clause was not applicable to distinctions drawn between current residents of a state.98 It was clear that no
member of the Court was sympathetic to O'Connor's attempt to reinvigorate the search for the right's constitutional home.
In Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor,9 9 the Court was given
the opportunity to adopt O'Connor's textual rationale for right-totravel cases or adopt an equally persuasive one of its own. Instead,
the Court reverted to Shapiro and reaffirmed its equal protection
analysis regarding the right. In Hooper, a New Mexico statute
granted a tax exemption to Vietnam veterans residing in the state before May 1976.'0' The statute did not employ a durational residency
requirement before new residents could receive the benefit. 0 1 Instead, the statute created a fixed, permanent distinction between Viet93 See, e.g., Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 525-26 (1978) (finding no peculiar source of
evil to Alaska's high unemployment posed by non-residents).
94 See LL at 527 (finding no relationship between Alaska's high unemployment and a
legislatively mandated hiring preference for Alaska residents, whether employed or not).
9 See Zobel, 457 U.S. at 76-77 (O'Connor, J.,concurring) ('It is difficult to imagine a
right more essential to the Nation as a whole than the right to establish residence in a new
State.").
96 See iL at 77-78.
9' See id.
at 78.
98 See id. at 81-83 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ('IT]he [Comity] Clause has no application
to a citizen of the State whose laws are complained of.") (citing The Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,77 (1873)).
99 472 U.S. 612 (1985).
'0o See id. at 614.
'0'See id&at 616-17.
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nam veterans who established residency in the state prior to May
1976 and all other residents.' 0 2
Accordingly, the Court examined the statute under the mere rationality test of the Equal Protection Clause. 10 3 The Court found no
legitimate state goal rationally related to the distinction between veterans residing in the state as of May 1976 and all others °4 The major
flaw of the statute was its service as a "continuing bounty for one
group of residents rather than simply an attempt to ease the veteran's
return to civilian life."'1 5 This continuing bounty justification closely
mirrors the past contribution justifications rejected by the Court in
Zobel.10 6 According to the statute, those who served the country by
military service during the Vietnam War and resided in New Mexico
as of May 1976 were granted permanent tax exemptions because of
their service. Those veterans who resided in New Mexico after May
1976 were denied the exemption presumably because their military
service contributed less to New Mexico than did the service of those
who were residents as of May 1976.107 Because the statute was not
rationally related to any legitimate governmental interest, the law was
unconstitutional.
Hooper dispelled any hope sparked by Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Zobel that the Court would attempt to place the
right to travel within the text of the Constitution. The Court firmly
relied on equal protection analysis without declaring or explaining the
source of the right, 0 8 while Justice O'Connor simply joined in Justice
Stevens's dissent."°9 In dissent, Justice Stevens did not urge the Court
to adopt a different test, but merely argued that New Mexico's statute
passed the mere rationality test and therefore should have been upheld
as constitutional."10

02

See id. at 618 n.6.

As in Zobel, the Court did not explicitly denote this case as a right-to-travel case except
in a footnote. See id. ("[R]ight to travel cases have examined, in equal protection terms, state
distinctions between newcomers and longer term residents. This case involves a distinction
between residents based on when they first established residence in the State. Following Zobel,
we subject this case to equal protection analysis.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
,04See id. at 619-22.
los Id.at621.
106 See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 64 (1982) ("Alaska's reasoning could open the
door to state apportionment of other rights, benefits, and services according to length of residency.").
107 See Hooper, 472 U.S. at 622-23 ("The New Mexico statute, by singling out previous
residents for the tax exemption, rewards only those citizens for the 'past contributions' toward
our Nation's military effort in Vietnam.").
logSee id. at 618 ("When a state distributes benefits unequally, the distinctions it makes are
subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
I0 See id. at 624 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"o See id. at 624-33.
103
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D. The Right Retooled
Beginning with Shapiro, the right to travel appeared firmly embedded in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The future of state laws drawing distinctions among residents by their
length of residence seemed clear. The Court would apply equal protection analysis, thereby requiring states to show that the statute was
rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Even though
mere rationality is a low standard of scrutiny, most state laws would
fail under the Court's analysis.
Nevertheless, the Court changed everything in Saenz v. Roe"' by
completely altering its right-to-travel analysis. Saenz involved a California statute limiting welfare benefits to residents of less than twelve
months.1 12 The maximum amount new residents could receive was
the amount they would have received in their prior state of residence." 3 The statute was distinguishable from previous unconstitutional statutes in two respects. First, the statute did not completely
deny benefits during the durational residency requirement as did the
statutes in Shapiro, Dunn, and Blumstein. Second, the statute did not
create fixed, permanent distinctions between new and established
residents as did the statutes at issue in Zobel and Hooper.
These distinctions did not prove dispositive, however, as the
Court declared the statute unconstitutional. Justice Stevens, writing
for the Court, began the analysis by stating: "The word 'travel' is not
found in the text of the Constitution. Yet the 'constitutional right to
travel from one State to another' is firmly embedded in our jurisprudence."' " 4 Stevens continued, stating that the right is ".a virtually
unconditional
personal right, guaranteed by the Constitution to us
15
all."'
After affirming the right's fundamental nature, Justice Stevens
radically altered the right-to-travel analysis by conforming the conflicting cases into three categories of constitutional protection." 6 The
first category of the right to travel was "the right of a citizen of one
State to enter and to leave another State.""17 This right, the right to
pass through a state, was expressed and protected in Edwards and
Guest. Stevens denied the need to "identify the source of that particular right in the text of the Constitution."" 8 The second category
".

526 U.S. 489 (1999).

112 See id. at 492.
113 See id.

ld. at 498 (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966)).
Id. (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 643 (1969) (Stewart, L, concurring)).
116 Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (identifying three broad categories of commercial activity that Congress could regulate).
117 Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500.
"s Id. at501.
,14
15
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of the right to travel was "the right to be treated as a welcome visitor
rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second
State."11 9 This second component of the right to travel, the right to
visit another state, was held to be expressly protected by the Comity
Clause.12 The Court affirmed this right
22 in Baldwin v. Fish & Game
2
Commission' ' and in Wandis v. Kline.1
The third component of the right to travel was "the right of the
newly arrived citizen to the same privileges and immunities enjoyed
by other citizens of the same State.' 2 3 In finding a textual source for
this component of the right to travel, the right to migrate to another
state, Stevens claimed that the right was protected by the newly arrived citizen's status as a citizen of the United States. 24 The Citizenship Clause'25 and Privileges or Immunities Clause 126 of the Fourteenth Amendment work in conjunction to protect this aspect of the
right to travel. 27 Justice Stevens claimed that "it has always been
common ground that [the Privileges or Immunities] Clause protects
the third component of the right to travel."' 28 In support of this claim,
he cited the Slaughter-House Cases.1 29 Because a newly arrived citizen is doubly protected under the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the
result of state and national citizenship, the30 Court would apply strict
scrutiny similar to that applied in Shapiro.
119

Id.

'20 See id.
121 436 U.S. 371, 390-91 (1978) (upholding a state law requiring nonresidents to pay more
than residents for a hunting license).
'2 412 U.S. 441, 445 (1973) (upholding a state law requiring nonresidents to pay more
than residents for college tuition).
123 Saenz, 526 U.S. at 502.
24 See id.
125 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. I ("All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside.").
12 U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.").
127 See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 502 n.15 ("The [Fourteenth] Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause... guaranteed the rights of newly freed black citizens by ensuring that they could
claim the state citizenship of any State in which they resided and by precluding that State from
abridging their rights of national citizenship.").
'28 Id. at 503.
'29 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). Stevens's reliance on Slaughter-Houseis peculiar, in that
Slaughter-House interpreted the Privileges or Immunities Clause as protecting rights already in
the Constitution, and therefore, adding no new protections. See id. at 71. See also ROBERT H.
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 37 (1990) ("The
privileges and immunities clause, whose intended meaning remains largely unknown, was given
a limited construction by the Supreme Court and has since remained dormant."). Bork argues
that the clause "has been a mystery since its adoption and in consequence has, quite properly,
remained a dead letter." Id. at 166. Bork's viewpoint on the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
however, is not the only position taken in legal scholarship. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 22 (1980) ("[T]here is not a bit of legislative history that supports
the view that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was intended to be meaningless.").
,30 See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 504.
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California attempted to save the statute by offering an entirely
fiscal justification. By capping welfare benefits for a new resident's
first year, California would save millions of dollars annually. 13' Resorting to strict scrutiny, however, the Court did not ask whether this
fiscal savings justification was legitimate but rather whether California may accomplish such savings by discriminating against new residents. The Court held the discriminatory means impermissible under
the Citizenship Clause. 132 Accordingly, the California statute was
held unconstitutional. 3 3
After Saenz, the Constitution still does not explicitly mention the
right to travel. Notwithstanding this constitutional silence, current
Supreme Court jurisprudence protects three newly-styled components
of the claimed right. The Court has conceded that one component is
not comprehended by the Constitution's language, and the other two
are protected by, as the Court understands them, distinct clauses.
Even though the Comity Clause has always been in the text of the
Constitution, it was not recognized as a source of the right until 1982,
and then only by one member of the Court.'34 The Privileges or Immunities Clause was ratified in 1868 and asserted as the source in
1941, and then only by one member of the Court.' 35 It was not until
1999 that a majority of the Court asserted the clause as a source of the
by
right. 136 Even more alarming, the third component is not protected
137
the text of the Constitution, but by the Court's precedent only.
Has the Court honored its duty to interpret the Constitution in a
way that makes sense in creating an intricate and unclear right-totravel analysis? It has not. But this is not to say that the Constitution
does not protect a right to travel. Rather, this is to say only that the
Court should clearly and logically spell out how the Constitution
protects this right. If it is unable to do so, the Court risks the appearance of being motivated to substitute its own will for that of state
legislatures. It is that appearance-the Court as "nine-headed Caesar"--that threatens to subvert the very nature of our democratic system.
'3'

See id. at 506.

132 See id. ("'That Clause does not provide for, and does not allow for, degrees of citizen-

ship based on length of residence."') (quoting Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 69 (1982)).
133 See id. at 507-08. The Court further considered whether congressional approval of the
California statute restored the constitutionality of the statute by way of Congress's power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which states: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 5.
The Court held that Congress did not have the power to "validate a law that denies the rights
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." Saenz, 526 U.S. at 508.
134See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55,73 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
13s See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 183 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("I do
not ignore or belittle the difficulties of what has been characterized by this Court as an 'almost
forgotten' clause.").
136 See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 489.
137 See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Edwards,314 U.S. at 160.
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It.FRUITLESS SEARCHES FOR THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL

It is not surprising that scholars, like the Court, have struggled
with the right to travel and its constitutional source. In all, the Court
and scholars have asserted no less than ten possible sources for the
right: the Commerce Clause, the Comity Clause, the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Ninth
Amendment, Implied Fundamental Rights, and the Citizenship,
Privileges or Immunities, Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Douglas, the most outspoken
member of the Court in support of the right to travel, is representative
of the controversy. Throughout the years, Douglas traced the right to
a variety of sources: the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 138 the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 3 9 the penumbra of the First Amendment, 140 and, as a matter of
inference, from a combination of the Comity Clause, the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce
Clause, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment, and from the very nature of the Federal Union.141 This Section
discusses many of these clauses and the arguments supporting them
as a source for the right to travel. It concludes that the arguments are
historically incorrect, unpersuasive, or ambiguous at best.
A. The Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause states that "[t]he Congress shall have
Power ...[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."' 142 This clause, has
never been relied upon as the exclusive source for the right to travel.
Instead, on those occasions where the Court has searched for the
right's source, the Commerce Clause has been cited, though never
definitively, in support of a right to travel. 4 3
The use of the Commerce Clause as the source for the right to
travel, no matter which aspect of travel is at issue, suffers from several critical defects. First and foremost, commerce, understood as
intercourse in commodities, is vastly different from the movement of
See Edwards, 314 U.S. at 178 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958).
140 See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 24 (1965) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
141 See New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1959) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
142 U.S. CONST.art. I, § 8, cl.
3.
'43 See Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wail.) 35,43 (1867) (discussing the applicability of
the Commerce Clause as a source for the right to travel, but ultimately finding that "we do not
concede that the question before us is to be determined" by the Commerce Clause). See also
Edwards,314 U.S. at 177 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[Tlhe right of persons to move freely from
State to State occupies a more protected position in our constitutional system than does the
movement of cattle, fruit, steel and coal across state lines.").
138

139
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human beings. 144 Even if it could be said that the movement of commercial goods and persons are both commerce, not all travel of persons is commercial in nature. 45 While it is redundant to say that the
interstate movement of commercial goods is commercial in nature, it
is overinclusive to say that the movement of persons is commercial in
nature. Some travel is commercial while other travel is not, and to
allow all travel to be protected by the Commerce Clause is intellectually dishonest.
Perhaps the most fatal defect in using the Commerce Clause as
the source of the right is that the Commerce Clause does not confer
personal rights. Instead, it grants Congress power to regulate commerce. Assuming that persons are commerce or that travel is commercial in nature, the right to travel would be subject to the regulatory
whims of Congress,' 46 and in the absence of Congressional regulation,
states, under the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.14 7 In contrast,
modem cases have held that both federal and state interference with
the right to travel will be declared unconstitutional. 148 Nevertheless,
the Commerce Clause does not confer rights; rather, it defines the
power of Congress. Hence, the right to travel would not be a constitutional right, but a right dependent on state or federal legislative
creation. If so, the right to travel is no right at all. Accordingly, the
Commerce Clause is a poor textual provision for grounding the right
to travel within the text of the Constitution.
B. The FirstAmendment
The First Amendment' 49 has been proposed as a source for the
right to travel in a few cases. In Aptheker v. Secretary of State,150 the
144

Justice Jackson stated as much in his concurring opinion in Edwards: "To hold that the

measure of [a migrant's rights] is the commerce clause is likely to result eventually either in
distorting the commercial law or in denaturing human rights." Edwards, 314 U.S. at 182 (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
145 See Todd Zubler, Note, The Right to Migrate and Welfare Reform: Timefor Shapiro v.
Thompson to Take a Hike, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 893, 912 (1997) (questioning whether the Commerce Clause can protect a right to travel if such travel is not linked to commerce).
146 See Karin Fromson Segall, It's Not Black and White: Spencer v. Casavilla and the Use
of the Right of Intrastate Travel in Section 1985(3), 57 BROOK. L REv. 473, 491-92 (1991)
(ITihe Commerce Clause is a grant of power to the Congress, [and therefore] it cannot be a
grant of power to the people to travel freely.").
147Felix Frankfurter explained the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine thusly: "'Mhe
doctrine [is] that the commerce clause, by its own force and without national legislation, puts it
into the power of the Court to place limits on state authority."' CHEMERINSKY, supra note 36,
at 307 (quoting FELix FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY &
WAITE 18 (1937)). Under the doctrine, state and local laws may regulate interstate commerce
only as long as the laws do not place an undue burden on interstate commerce. See id.
141 See Baker, supra note 39, at 1140-41 n.63 ("[Tihe modem right to travel cannot be
grounded in the commerce clause.., because many recent decisions forbid federal government
action restricting travel.").
149 U.S. CONsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
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Supreme Court struck down a ban on the use of passports by Communists. The Court held that the ban impinged on the right to travel
protected by the First and Fifth Amendments.15 1 The Court's use of
the First Amendment as a source for the right to travel, however, was
short-lived. In Zemel v. Rusk,152 decided just one year after Aptheker,
the Court placed the right to travel solely in the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment,
expressly rejecting the First Amendment as
1 53
a source of the right.
The Court's quick retreat was hastened by Aptheker's extremely
attenuated argument in support of the First Amendment as the source
for the right to travel. None of the First Amendment's clauses directly relate to any aspect of travel. It is true that under some circumstances, as in Aptheker, a limitation that violates the First Amendment
will indirectly affect the right to travel. The real issue in Aptheker,
however, was not the right to travel, but rather the freedom of individuals to openly declare themselves to be Communists. Since federal law banned professed Communists from using their passports,
their freedom of speech had been violated. Because the First
Amendment, by its very terms, does not directly deal with the right to
travel, it is an improper textual source for the right.
C. The Due ProcessClause of the Fifth Amendment
In a handful of cases, the Supreme Court has proposed that the
right to travel is either completely within the purview of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment or is protected by it in combination with other clauses. When claiming that the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment protects the right to travel, the Court has
limited the protection of the right to international travel, 154 an aspect
not mentioned in Saenz.155 In Kent v. Dulles, 56 the Court held that
the Due Process Clause protected a federal right of United States citipress; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.").
150 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
151 See id. at 505 ("[Tlhe right to travel abroad is an important aspect of the citizen's 'liberty' guaranteed in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment."); id. at 516-17
("[F]reedom of travel is a constitutional liberty closely related to the rights of free speech and
association ....
");id. at 520 ("Freedom of movement is kin to the right of assembly and to the
right of association.").
152 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
151 See id. at 16.
15 In Shapiro, Justice Harlan urged the Court to locate the right to travel in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 669-71 (1969)
(Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Segall, supra note 146, at 487-88 ("[T]he Fifth Amendment
has not been used outside the context of international travel and is not a restriction on state
power.").
1-5 See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500-04 (1999) (affirming the right to pass through, to
visit and to migrate to another state).
116 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
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zens to travel internationally. 157 As discussed previously, 158 the Zemel Court held that a ban on travel to Cuba did not impinge the right
to travel located solely in the Fifth Amendment.1 59 Also in Aptheker,
the Court held that the right was protected by a combination of the
First and Fifth Amendments. 60 Because Saenz did not mention the
right to international travel, the Court may no longer consider the
right deserving of constitutional protection.
More importantly, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause is
a poor choice as the source for the right to travel for several reasons.
First and foremost, the Due Process Clause has traditionally ensured
only that "citizens receive adequate process when the federal government is interfering with personal liberty."' 162 Therefore, so long as
a person received adequate process before they were deprived of their
right to travel, there would be no Fifth Amendment violation. Secondly, the Fifth Amendment applies only against the federal government, leaving states free to deprive persons of the right to travel, at
least until the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, which includes
its own Due Process Clause applicable against states. 163 Finally, the
subject matter of the Fifth Amendment is primarily concerned with
criminal proceedings: requiring a grand jury indictment in capital or
other serious crimes, prohibiting double jeopardy, prohibiting selfincrimination, and forbidding the deprivation of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.'6 Broadening the clause's reach to
protect the right to travel goes far beyond rights implicated in any
judicial proceeding, criminal or otherwise. Within the apparently narrow scope of the Fifth Amendment, whether the scope is concerned
solely with criminal proceedings, or more generally with fair procedures in all cases, it is unlikely and unpersuasive to argue that the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects the right to travel.

1s7

See id at 125. The question whether there is a right to international travel is outside the

scope of this Note. If such a constitutional right exists, some argue that the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment is the most likely source of that right. See Segall, supra note 146, at
487-88.
58 See supra text accompanying notes 152-53.
59 See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1965).
160 See supranote 151.
161 The right to international travel was not before the Court in Saenz, but neither were the
rights to travel through or to visit another state, and the Court still felt compelled to discuss
those rights in protecting a general right to travel. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500-02

(1999).
Segall, supra note 146, at 488.
See infra notes 210-28 and accompanying text.
1 4 See U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The last clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the taking of private property for public use without just compensation, and accordingly does not fit
into the criminal proceeding category.
162
63
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D. The Ninth Amendment

The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage other rights retained by the people."' 65 Of any in the Bill
of Rights, this amendment provides the least direction as to its import, protection, and enforceability-so little that some have referred to the amendment as a "constitutional joker."' 166 No matter
the amendment's moniker, scholars differ widely as to the
amendment's scope. Professor Rakove argues that the language of
the amendment "suggests that fundamental rights not mentioned in
the Constitution can secure constitutional recognition."1 67 Similarly, Professor Ely maintains that "the conclusion that the Ninth
Amendment was intended to signal the existence of federal constitutional rights beyond those specifically enumerated in the Constitution is the only
conclusion its language seems comfortably
68
able to support."'
Others have read the amendment much more narrowly. Judge
Bork, for example, contends that the amendment did not create "a
mandate to invent constitutional rights" and any broader reading is
counter to the ideas of the Founders.' 69 Looking to James Madison, the amendment's drafter, Professor Berger maintains that the
purpose of the amendment was "[t]o obviate the implication that
nonmentioned rights 'were intended
to be assignedinto the hands
170
of the general Government."",
Due in part to the continuing debate over even the simplest
questions concerning the amendment, and in part to the Court's
preference for the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as the source of the right, the Court has never advocated the Ninth Amendment as the source for the right. The Ninth
165 U.S.

CONST. amend. IX. For numerous viewpoints on the meaning of the amendment,

see generally THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE

NINTH AMENDMENT (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989).
16

JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE

CONSTITUTION 289 (1996). Professor Kyvig characterized the Ninth Amendment in relation to
the Tenth Amendment as "a tub to the whale"-James Madison's attempt to divert criticism
away from substantive holes in the Bill of Rights. See DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLiCr AND
AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 1776-1995, at 99 (1996).
'67 RAKOVE, supra note 166, at 289.
168 ELY, supra note 129, at 38. Ely argues that the Court is in the position to declare what
those unenumerated rights are and enforce them. See id. at 40. ("Surely there was nothing
remotely resembling a consensus that judicial authority to review was generally to be curtailed:
if anything, the consensus ran the other way.").
169 BORK, supra note 129, at 183-84 ("[The Founders could not have contemplated both
that the judiciary would play a quite insignificant role and, simultaneously, that they had delegated to judges the power to create new constitutional rights not mentioned in the Constitution.").
170 RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 55 (2d. ed. 1997) (quoting I ANNALS OF CoNG. 456 (1789)).
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Amendment's ambiguity makes it difficult to criticize any argument that it protects unenumerated rights. The best criticism is to

place a right either outside the purview of the Constitution's concem or within the protection of some other constitutional clause.
As will be discussed below, other clauses in the Constitution may
better protect the right to travel, thus negating the need to place the
right under the Ninth Amendment's highly debatable protection.
E. Implied FundamentalRight
The Supreme Court long ago decided that the Constitution contains implied powers, nowhere mentioned, but necessarily implied. In
7
Marbury v. Madison,1
1 Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court,
held that the Constitution implies the power of judicial review, requiring the judiciary to strike down laws made in contravention of the
Constitution. 172 Even though congressional powers are enumerated in
the Constitution, 7 3 the Court held in McCulloch v. Maryland'7 4 that

all congressional means were constitutional if the end was legitimate,
and the measures were consistent with the letter and the spirit of the
Constitution. 175 Along with these implied powers of the judicial and
legislative branches, the Court has embraced other governmental
powers and strictures not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution,
such as federalism 176 and separation of powers. 7 7 Whether these implied powers are truly implied by the text of the Constitution or were
178
created out of whole cloth, their propriety is no longer questioned.
Notwithstanding this storied tradition of implied governmental
powers, the general theory of implied fundamental rights and of specific implied rights has never been uniformly accepted. While the
't 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

172See id. at 178 ("[T]he constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature....
[Any other doctrine] would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions').
173 See U.S. CONST. art. , § 8.

,7417 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
175 See id. at 421.
176 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that Congress could not subject
states to suit without the consent of the states); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (denying review of state court decision based upon adequate and independent state law grounds).
"n See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (declaring legislative veto unconstitutional because the Presentment Clause of Article II was not complied with); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 135 (1976) ("Congress could not, merely because it concluded that such a measure
was 'necessary and proper' to the discharge of its substantive legislative authority.... vest in
itself, or in its officers, the authority to appoint officers of the United States ...").
178See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that the dual sovereignty
of state and federal governments does not allow state officers to be controlled by federal officials); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that Congress may not commandeer state legislatures to enact federal regulatory programs); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654 (1988) (holding that the executive branch had sufficient oversight and control over independent counsels so as not to transgress separation of powers). Cf.iU at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that anything short of complete presidential oversight of an independent
counsel violates separation of powers doctrine).
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Court has protected numerous implied fundamental rights,1 79 some
scholars and Justices have railed against such protection. In arguing
for a limited set of implied fundamental rights, Professor Graglia
maintains:
Although the Constitution does not use the term, "fundamental rights," it can fairly be said that the two most fundamental rights it provides are to be governed by electorally accountable officials and to be governed primarily by local officials. Ironically, what proponents of fundamental rights are
actually urging today is greater policy making by the courts
and ultimately by the U.S. Supreme Court-a committee of
nine lawyers, unelected and unremovable by elections, issuing decrees from Washington, D.C., for the governance of the
nation as a whole. What they are urging, then, is not protection, but violation of our most fundamental constitutional

rights. 180
Conversely, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., argued not only that the
Constitution contained implied fundamental rights but that these implied rights continually change. Justice Brennan stated: "Each generation has the choice to overrule or add to the fundamental principles
enunciated by the Framers ....What the constitutional fundamentals
meant to the wisdom
18 of other times cannot be their measure to the
vision of our time.,, '
The implied fundamental right rationale for the right to travel has
been cited more frequently by the Court than the other potential
sources for the right. In its 1867 Crandall decision, the Court held
that the notion of citizenship included the right to travel. 18 2 In Edwards, the majority alluded to the "theory that the peoples of the several States must sink or swim together." 183 Justice Douglas's Edwards concurrence stated that the fact that "the right was implied did
not make it any less 'guaranteed' by the Constitution." 1 4 In United
179 See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE Er AL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 813-1048 (3rd ed.

1996) (discussing the Court's protection of the rights to contract, procreate, vote, access the
ballot and judicial process, travel, receive welfare, education, privacy, abortion, family autonomy, and die).
180 Lino A. Graglia, The Constitution and 'FundamentalRights', in THE FRAMERS AND
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 86, 87 (Robert A. Licht ed., 1991). See also ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 38 (1997) (describing an evolving interpretation of the Constitution as "infinitely more powerful than ... common law... trump[ing] even the statutes of
democratic legislatures").
181 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 23, 27 (Jack
N. Rakove ed., 1990).
182See Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35,44 (1867).
183 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173-74 (1941).
18 Id. at 178 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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States v. Guest,185 the right was held to "occuy] a position fundaIn Guest, Justice
mental to the concept of our Federal Union."
Stewart continued: "[The] right finds no explicit mention in the Constitution. The reason, it has been suggested, is that a right so eleconmentary was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary
18 7
comitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created."'
The adaptation of equal protection analysis in Shapiro did not
dissuade the Court from its belief that the right was of the implied
fundamental sort.1 88 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Shapiro, stated: "Wehave no occasion to ascribe the source of this right.
. to a particular constitutional provision."' 189 Later, Justice Brennan
went a step further in his Zobel concurrence: "[T]he frequent attempts
to assign the right to travel to some textual source in the Constitution
90
seem to me to have proved both inconclusive and unnecessary."'
Evaluating the tests for and against declaring the right to travel as an
implied fundamental right makes it clear that neither is conclusive.
The essential question is whether the Constitution's framers vested
the judiciary with the power to protect rights that are not enumerated
in the Constitution's text. Justice Brennan and others have assumed
that the judiciary has this power. Because modem society takes certain rights for granted, the right to travel for example, this generation
may add them to the list of inherited fundamental rights.' 9'
Conversely, others would not grant the right to travel constitutional status as an implied fundamental right. Instead, those facets of
travel taken for granted would be entrusted to local, politically accountable officials for protection. In the interests of democracy, the
safer path seems to be that declaring the right to travel as an implied
fundamental right is "antithetical to responsible judicial decisionmaking [allowing] [t]he Supreme Court . . . to act in a quasi92
legislative fashion, unconstrained by the text of the Constitution."'
If a textual source for the right exists, all would agree that it should be

'85 383 U.S. 745 (1966).

"6 Id.at 757.
'87Id. at758.
18 See ELY, supra note 129, at 177 (noting that "the Court has. been almost smug in its
refusal to provide" an explanation for the protection of the right to travel). See also Segall,
supra note 146, at 494 ("Indeed it seems as if the Supreme Court has given up trying to locate a
single source.... Because there is such a long tradition of recognizing the right of interstate
travel, perhaps courts feel it must simply exist.") (footnote omitted).
189See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969).
190 See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55,66 (1982).
191Of course, the next generation would reevaluate the right to travel, and may decide that
the right is not fundamental, and therefore, undeserving of constitutional protection. See Brennan, supranote 181, at 27 ("[W]hat those fundamentals mean for us, our descendents will learn,
cannot be the measure to the vision of their time.").
192Baker, supranote 39, at 1142.
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articulated and relied upon rather than implying the right as fundamental to the nature of the Constitution.
F. Section 1 of the FourteenthAmendment
Although the Fourteenth Amendment has become the greatest
source of constitutional change in the twentieth century, its intended
significance has been the source of considerable scholarly debate.
Some have argued that the scope of the amendment was limited. 93
Others have attributed a much broader and sweeping scope to the
amendment.194 The Supreme Court has taken the latter position, so
much so that each clause has spawned its own jurisprudence protecting substantive rights. Indicative of this differing jurisprudence for
each clause protecting substantive rights, the Court has held at various
times that the right to travel is protected by the Citizenship Clause,
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
When considering the Fourteenth Amendment as a source for the
right to travel, one must keep in mind problems caused by the explicit
193

Professor Graglia, for example, maintains:

The purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was, in any event, very limited.
When reports from the South indicated that newly enacted "black codes" were denying blacks basic civil rights despite emancipation, the Radical Republicans... enacted the 1866 Civil Rights Act. The act required that blacks be treated equally with
whites in regard to such basic civil rights as owning property, making contracts, and
bringing lawsuits.... The Fourteenth Amendment was proposed and adopted to
constitutionalize the 1866 act in two respects: remove all doubt as to Congress's
authority to enact such a measure, which Congress then reenacted, and to raise the
act's protections to the status of constitutional rights, immune from repeal by ordinary legislation.
. .. All other alleged fundamental constitutional rights are the product of judicial policy making, almost always in the guise of interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Graglia, supra note 180, at 92-93 (footnote omitted). Professor Berger argues:
The three clauses of § I were three facets of one and the same concern: to insure that
there would be no discrimination against the freedmen in respect of "fundamental
rights," which had clearly understood and narrow compass. Roughly speaking, the
substantive rights were identified by the privileges or immunities clause; the equal
protection clause was to bar legislative discrimination with respect to those rights;
and the judicial machinery to secure them was to be supplied by nondiscriminatory
due process of the several States.
BERGER, supranote 170, at 17-18.
194 Though the Fourteenth Amendment neither expressly nor by implication warrants it, the
Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause as selectively
incorporating the Bill of Rights against the states. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 36, at 381-84.
Even if the Fourteenth Amendment does incorporate the Bill of Rights against the states, none
of the Bill of Rights serve as the source of the right to travel. See supra text accompanying
notes 149-170.
For a discussion of the incorporation debate, see AKHIL AMAR REED, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 137-40 (1998). See also KYvIG, supra note 166, at 168 ("[Tlhere was no reason for
later disputes as to whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights into the
equal protection and due process obligations of the States; it certainly did.").
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language of the amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment does not
195
limit the federal government but instead only state governments.
Therefore, as a source for the right to travel, the Fourteenth Amendment suffers from the opposite defect of the First, Fifth and Ninth
Amendments-the Fourteenth Amendment would allow the right to
be completely obliterated by the federal government. 196 Additionally,
because the Fourteenth Amendment was not ratified until 1868, basing the right to travel in the Fourteenth Amendment concedes that the
right was not constitutionally protected prior to the Fourteenth
Amendment's ratification.
1. The Citizenship Clause
The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that
"[a]U persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside." 197 Professor Cohen argues that this bestowal of citizenship makes it unconstitutional for a state "to deny
benefits to new citizens that are extended to other citizens similarly
situated-subject only to reasonable assurances that claims of new
residence are bona fide."' 198 Therefore, once a newcomer makes a
bona fide claim of residency, a state must grant the newcomer all
benefits granted to those residing in the state for a longer duration.
Once this claim of residency is made, 199 state citizenship is immediate
and any waiting period imposed would violate the Citizenship Clause
as a penalty on the right to travel. Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 2 ° however, might allow Congress to authorize states to
discriminate against newcomers by appropriate legislation.0 1
While the Court has never squarely accepted nor rejected Professor Cohen's contention in a right-to-travel case, Justice Brennan has
195 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
'9 See id. ("No State shall . . ") (emphasis added).
197 id.

198William Cohen, Discrimination Against New State Citizens: An Update, 11 CONST.
COMMENTARY 73, 79 (1994).
199 Generally the claim of bona fide residency is made by swearing an oath that the swearer
has lived in the state for the requisite period of time. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 346

(1972).
20 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
201 The Court rejected this argument in Saenz, where Congress had approved California
legislation limiting welfare benefits to residents of less than twelve months. See supra note 132.
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made arguments that resemble Cohen's. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Zobel, for example, argued that the "Citizenship
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment expressly equates citizenship
only with simple residence. That Clause does not provide for, nor
does it allow for, degrees of citizenship based upon length of residence." 20 2 Justice Brennan, however, consistently analyzed the right
to travel under the Equal Protection Clause.
When trying to place the right to travel within the text of the
Constitution, the Citizenship Clause is inadequate for several reasons.
As stated previously, the Citizenship Clause would only protect one
aspect of the right to travel, the right to migrate. By its very terms,
the clause could only apply to the right to migrate as opposed to the
rights to visit and to pass through. If the right is a part of citizenship,
the only subject matter of the clause, then only those residing, i.e. migrating, in a new state receive protection. The failure to protect all
aspects of the right to travel does not nullify Professor Cohen's argument, but it does leave the other aspects of the right in considerable
limbo. Additionally, the fact that citizenship is conferred immediately upon bona fide residence within a state does not necessarily bestow any particular substantive rights upon a new citizen. Accordingly, the Citizenship Clause is simply a statement conferring no independent substantive rights. This statement has specific historical
importance, which Professor Cohen fails to account for when interpreting the clause.
Dred Scott v. Sandford20 3 is the basis of the Citizenship Clause's
specific historical importance. In Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney
declared that persons of African descent could never be citizens of the
United States and thus had no standing to sue in federal court.2 0 4 The
Chief Justice feared "that if the Negro were recognized as a citizen
under the diverse-citizenship clause, he would have a firm basis for
claiming the rights of a citizen under the privileges-and-immunities
20 5
clause, and there lay a more serious threat to southern security.
For obvious reasons, Dred Scott has been uniformly condemned.20 6
202 Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 69 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).

See also Robert C. Farrell, ClassificationsThat Disadvantage Newcomers and the Problem of
Equality, 28 U. RICH. L. REv. 547, 552-53 (1994) ("[The] right to interstate migration is closely
connected to, if not indistinguishable from, the equality of citizenship that is required by the
Fourteenth Amendment."); David A. Donahue, Note, Penalizing the Poor: Durational Residency Requirementsfor Welfare Benefits, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 451,470-71 (1998) (discussing
Brennan's argument in Zobel).
203 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
2o4 See id. at 426-27. See also The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 73
(1873) ("[]t had been held by this court ... that a man of African descent, whether a slave or
not, was not and could not be a citizen of a State or of the United States.").
205 DON E. FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY, LAW, AND POLITICS: THE DRED SCOTT CASE
IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 194 (1981).
2o6 See, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 73 (1873) ("[Dred Scott]

met the condemnation of some of the ablest statesmen and constitutional lawyers of the country
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The Fourteenth Amendment, and specifically the Citizenship Clause,
was a direct refutation and reversal of Taney's holding. °7 According
to Justice Miller in the Slaughter-House Cases,0 8 the clause "overturns the Dred Scott decision by making all persons born within the
United States and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the United
States. ' '2 9 Any interpretation of the Citizenship Clause that goes beyond refuting Dred Scott and making citizens of freedmen misinterprets the language and history of the clause. Thus, the right to travel
cannot be placed within the Citizenship Clause.
2. The Due Process Clause
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that "[n]o state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 210 This clause has been deemed the
"most important modern development in the constitutional protection
of political and civil liberties in the United States-the creation of a
second bill of rights through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 21 Unfortunately, this development was not accomplished through the "formal process of constitutional amendment...
[but rather] through decisions of the United States Supreme Court
interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
over a period of a hundred years. 2 12
This informal process of constitutional amendment was perfected by the creation of two due process components, substantive
and procedural. The substantive aspect of due process questions
whether a purported right is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty
and deeply rooted in the Nation's history." 213 If so, the Court will
employ a balancing test, balancing the importance of the liberty interest against the governmental interest served by the statute. 1 4 If, however, the purported right is fundamental (in addition to being a liberty
interest), the balancing test is set aside and the statute can be justified
only if there is a compelling state interest and the statute is "narrowly
.. "). Abraham
.
Lincoln decried Dred Scott as "based on assumed historical facts which were
not really true" making "a mangled ruin" of the Declaration of Independence. STEPHEN B.
OATES, WITH MALICE TOWARDS NONE: A LIFE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 133-34 (1994).
See ALAN P. GRIMES, DEMOCRACY AND THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION 43

(1978) ("[The Citizenship Clause] makes plain only what has been rendered doubtful by the past
action of the Government.") (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1 Sess. 3031-33 (1868))
(quoting Missouri Sen. Henderson).
203 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 73.
2W9i
210 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
211 RICHARD C. CORTNER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS, at xi

(1981).

212 id. at ix.

213 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
214 See Baker, supranote 39, at 1143 (explaining the balancing approach).
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drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake., 21 5 The
procedural aspect is much less stringent, requiring only that "a deprivation of life, liberty, or property be preceded by notice
'216 and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.
In the right-to-travel area, the Supreme Court has only analyzed
one statute under the Due Process Clause, and then only under the
clause's procedural aspect. In Vlandis v. Kline,217 the Court was
asked to determine whether the Due Process Clause was violated
where a university imposed an irrebuttable presumption of out-ofstate residency when an applicant had lived outside of the state in the
preceding year.218 In finding the presumption unconstitutional, Justice Stewart reasoned that the distinction in tuition rates was primarily
concerned with residency and that an irrebuttable presumption against
residency offended the Due Process Clause.21 9 The Court held that
the Due Process Clause requires "that the State allow ...an individual the opportunity to present evidence showing that he is a bona fide
resident entitled to the in-state rates. 2
Vlandis demonstrates the
incongruity of procedural due process with the right to travel. Procedural due process does not protect a right to travel; rather, it protects
against an irrebuttable presumption of non-residency. In sum, procedural due process only requires that a state allow individuals the opportunity to produce evidence of residency, an issue wholly unrelated
to travel.
Regarding the substantive aspect of due process, the Court has
never considered substantive due process as a source for the right to
travel. The Court does, however, have a long history of protecting
liberty interests, notwithstanding the substantive aspect's dubious
footing,22 ' leading several commentators to argue that the substantive
aspect of the Due Process Clause is the source of the right to travel.
These commentators look to the Court's substantive due process inquiry: is the right at issue "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty[]

215
216

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). See also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (holding that
when the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property are deprived, there must
be an opportunity for some kind of hearing); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding
that the deprivation of a statutory entitlement such as welfare must be preceded by a pretermination evidentiary hearing).
217 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
218 See id. at 443.
219 See id. at 446.
220 Id. at 452.
221 See, e.g., BORK, supra note 129, at 31 ("'[S]ubstantive due process' ... has been used
countless times ... by judges who want to write their personal beliefs into a document that,
most inconveniently, does not contain those beliefs."); ELY, supranote 129, at 18 ("[We apparently need periodic reminding that 'substantive due process' is a contradiction in terms-sort of
like 'green pastel redness."').
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or deeply rooted in this Nation's history?, 222 In answering this question, commentators enthusiastically contend that the right to travel is
both.223 This contention is somewhat persuasive in light of the
Court's substantive due process jurisprudence, protecting, among
other things, the right of extended families to live together, 22 the right
225 and the right of married
of women to choose to have
226 abortions,

people to use contraceptives.

Even assuming that the Constitution includes a substantive aspect of due process, such an approach is poorly suited to the right to
travel. In those cases where the Court has protected a right under
substantive due process, those rights have been primarily concerned
with familial autonomy.22 7 The right to travel, however, does not implicate the same familial autonomy concerns. Although some right to
travel cases may concern families desiring to migrate to another state,

a similar number of cases may concern individuals entering other
states only to conduct business, a situation analogous to Lochner v.
New York. 228 Therefore, the right to travel is not protected under the
Court's ill-chosen substantive due process jurisprudence.
3. The Equal ProtectionClause
The Equal Protection Clause states: "No State shall... deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 229

In the annals of constitutional law, no constitutional clause "has been
a more prolific source of major judicial innovations than the equal
protection clause."230 Justice Holmes characterized equal protection
222 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
22 See Segall, supra note 146, at 487-88 ("Because the right to travel has often been
deemed a fundamental personal liberty, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments have been suggested as sources for the right of interstate travel.") (footnotes
omitted); Baker, supranote 39, at 1143 ("[A] person's right to travel abroad now seems firmly
established as a liberty which cannot be denied without due process."); Andrew C. Porter,
Comment, Toward a ConstitutionalAnalysis of the Right to Intrastate Travel, 86 Nw. U. L.
REV. 820, 850-51 (1992) ("Supreme Court precedent recognizes the right to travel as a liberty
interest, necessarily requiring protection by the Due Process Clause.") (footnote omitted).
224 See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
22 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
226 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
27 See Segall, supra note 146, at 489 n.88 ("Today, the cases that do find substantive due
process rights have been primarily limited to decisions about family matters or procreation.").
m 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner inferred the right of bakers to freely contract. The Supreme Court declared the right a liberty interest protected under substantive due process. The
decision has been widely criticized. See Segall, supra note 146, at 489 n.87 (collecting cases).
29 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
23" Michael J. Perry, Modem Equal Protection:A Conceptualizationand Appraisal, 79
COLuM. L REv. 1023, 1024 (1979). Professor Commager asserts:
What we are witnessing now is a shift, not as yet decisive but significant, of the
center of gravity from the Due Process Clause to the Equal Protection Clause of [the
Fourteenth] Amendment. It is highly probable that to the next generation the Equal
Protection Clause will be, in constitutional and political interpretation, what the Due
Process Clause was in the past.
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arguments as "the usual last resort of constitutional arguments. 2 3'
Unfortunately, the clause has often become the first resort of the Supreme Court's analysis, 232 especially in right-to-travel cases. Since
Shapiro, the Supreme Court has primarily scrutinized legislation affecting the right to travel under equal protection analysis.2 33 In this
analysis, the Court has consistently held that the Equal Protection
Clause is intertwined with the right even though the clause is not the
source of the right. 34
If the phrase "equal protection of the laws" were literally applied, almost all legislation would be declared unconstitutional. Thus,
literal interpretation is impractical because "[c]lassification is an inescapable part of government.... [Therefore, the Court must] articulate
some general principle or principles by which to separate constitutional from unconstitutional differentiations. 2 3
Professor Berger
argues that "the [amendment's] framers' intention [was] to outlaw
laws which discriminated against blacks with respect to the 'coverage
of the Civil Rights Act [of 1866]. '''236 Berger's protestations aside,
the Court has moved beyond such a limited scope.
The genesis of the Court's expansive construction of the Equal
Protection Clause is Justice Stone's Carolene Products footnote.7
Henry Steele Commager, EqualProtectionas an Instrument of Revolution, in CONSTITUTIONAL
GOVERNMENT INAMERICA 467,467 (Ronald K. L. Collins ed., 1980).
231 ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 161 (Sanford Levinson ed.,
1994).
232 See BORK, supra note 129, at 63 (stating that the Equal Protection Clause "became not
the last but the first resort of constitutional argument").
233See supra Part LB-C. But see Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (declaring the
irrebutable presumption of non-residency was a violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
2 See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 n.6 (1982). See also Segall, supra note
146, at 492 ("[T]he Court noted that the use of an equal protection analysis did not necessarily
mean that the Equal Protection Clause was the source of the right to travel.").
While the Court has analyzed right-to-travel cases under the Equal Protection Clause, the
Court has been adamant that the textual source for the right to travel is unknown and unnecessary. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966) (declaring that while the right to
travel is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, it "occupies a position fundamental to the
concept of our Federal Union.").
235 ARCHIBALD Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 59

(1976).
236 BERGER, supra note 170, at 124. The coverage of the Civil Right Act "secured to
blacks the same right to contract, to hold property, and to sue, as whites enjoyed." Md at 201.
Accordingly, "[i]f no privilege was accorded to a white, a State was not required to furnish it to
anyone." Id.at 219.
237See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). Justice
Stone stated:
[Liegislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more
exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation.
...Nor need we enquire [sic] whether similar considerations enter into the
review of statutes directed at particular religious ... or racial minorities, whether
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In essence, Justice Stone stated that an equal protection problem
arises whenever a "discrete and insular minority" is disadvantaged by
legislation. What followed was a trifurcation of standards of review
based not upon any constitutional text or principle but rather the collective fancy of the Court. If a statute classifies based upon race, the
Court has uniformly applied strict scrutiny, under which the statute
will be invalidated unless the government can show a compelling
governmental interest served by the statute and the statute is narrowly
tailored to effectuate the governmental interest.2 38 If the classification
is based upon gender, the Court has applied an intermediate level of
scrutiny, under which the statute will be invalidated unless it serves
an important (rather than compelling) governmental interest and the
statute is substantially related to accomplishing that interest. 3 All
other classifications have required only mere rationality; in other
words, the statute must only be rationally related to a governmental
interest in order to be held constitutional.2 40
Accordingly, it would seem that statutes affecting the right to
travel would be subject only to mere rationality review by the Court
because, since Shapiro, all cases affecting the right to travel have
classified persons only on the basis of durational residency, not on the
basis of race or gender. Nevertheless, the Court has often subjected
such statutes to strict scrutiny. 241 Professor McCoy argues that the
strict scrutiny approach is justified because, even though the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to protect black citizens, the Supreme Court has interpreted the amendment broadly and "has applied
strict equal protection whenever the disadvantaged group occupies the
same position with respect to state government as that occupied by
blacks."' 242

prejudice againstdiscrete and insularminorities may be a special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operationof those politicalprocesses ordinarilyto be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searchingjudicialinquiry.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). For criticism of Justice Stone's footnote, see BORK,
supra note 129, at 58-61 (arguing that since the Constitution already protects religious, national,
and racial minorities, "discrete and insular minorities" can only be those "not protected by a
constitutional provision who cannot win their point in the political process because of 'prejudice"').
23 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (applying the "most rigid
scrutiny" to a statute incarcerating persons of Japanese ancestry in internment camps during
World War 11).
239 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
24 See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd.v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) (finding that
denying benefits to some employees based on length of service was not irrational or arbitrary).
241 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
242 Thomas R. McCoy, Recent Equal ProtectionDecisions-FundamentalRight to Travel
or "Newcomers" as a Suspect Class?, 28 VAND. L. REv. 987, 1017 (1975). But see Donahue,
supra note 202, at 471 (arguing that newcomers, while a minority, cannot be characterized as
"discrete and insular" and therefore are not deserving of a heightened level of scrutiny).
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The Court, however, has never equated newcomers, visitors, or
passers-through to the historical position of blacks, as Professor
McCoy suggests. Instead, the Court has justified a heightened level
of scrutiny by declaring the right to travel an implied fundamental
right.243 Because implied fundamental rights are nowhere mentioned
in the Constitution, the Court incorporated the rights into equal protection analysis in Skinner v. Oklahoma.244 In Skinner, the Court reviewed an Oklahoma statute authorizing the sterilization of persons
convicted three times of felonies involving moral turpitude. In striking down the statute under the equal protection clause, the Court focused on the fact that the statute penalized larcenists but not embezzlers.245 The Court concluded that the statute failed strict scrutiny
because the statute offended "one of the basic civil rights of man.
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race." 246
There are basic problems with the fundamental rights strand of
equal protection. One such problem is determining which rights are
truly fundamental and where those rights come from. On this point
there is much disagreement. Judge Bork has argued, for example,
that only those rights explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution should
be understood as fundamental, and then only in the narrowest sense
possible. 247 Skinner rejected such a narrow interpretation of fundamental rights----"the right to procreate is not guaranteed, explicitly or
implicitly, by the Constitution.' 24 8 Therefore, Skinner stands for the
proposition that the Court will identify which rights are fundamental
and protect those rights against violation.249
In its identification and protection role, the Court has a long history of recognizing the right to travel. Crandall and Edwards protected the right after inferring its existence from the structure of the
Constitution. In Shapiro, the Court disavowed any need to place the
243 See supraPart LB.
244

316 U.S. 535 (1942).

24' See id. at 541.
m Id.

See BORK, supra note 129, at 63.
See id. at 66. Assuming that there are fundamental rights protected by the Equal Protection Clause, Bork's constrictive view is unappealing. See also Bryan H. Wildenthal, Note,
State Parochialism,the Right to Travel, and the Privilegesand Immunities Clause of Article IV,
41 STAN. L. REv. 1557, 1574 (1989) ("If a right is already substantively guaranteed in the Constitution, then the equal protection analysis becomes superfluous.").
249 See BORK, supra note 129, at 66. The Supreme Court's tendency to identify and protect
fundamental rights is troubling because it poses a danger that the Court will
invent new "fundamental rights," and then... protect them by subjecting to strict
scrutiny any classification scheme affecting them. Regardless of whether the exercise of the claimed right is itself the basis of classification, or is denied or hindered
as a result of a classification scheme, the problem remains the same: Where does the
right come from?
Wildenthal, supranote 248, at 1575.
247
248
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right within a specific constitutional provisiono but began analyzing
statutes affecting the right under the fundamental rights strain of the
Equal Protection Clause? 51 Once the right was protected under the
Equal Protection Clause, the Court had to decide when a statute affected the right to travel enough to trigger equal protection analysis.
In Shapiro, Justice Brennan stated that the inquiry would begin if
"any classification . . . serve[d] to penalize the exercise of that
52
right."
This penalty inquiry offers "nothing more than the illusion of a
principled judicial framework. '' 25 3 A penalty has been defined both as
"the denial of a ... fundamental political right" or "basic necessit[y]
of life" to those who have recently exercised their right 54 and as a
"permanent deprivation of a significant benefit." 25 5 But mere delays
to access may not amount to penalties because the benefit will "ultimately [be] obtained.' 256 As these widely divergent statements indicate, the penalty focus has been analytically unhelpful and unlikely to
produce the same outcome even in cases presenting similar circumstances.5 7
No matter how the Court applies the penalty inquiry, once it does
so, the Court must scrutinize the state statute under some level of
scrutiny. Under Skinner, the burdening of fundamental rights should
always be scrutinized under strict scrutiny. Beginning in Shapiro, the
Court found that the states may only infringe on the right to migrate
Following Shapiro, the
when the statute withstands strict scrutiny.
Court consistently applied this standard to state statutes affecting the
right to migrate. 9 In Zobel, however, the Court decided to straddle
m See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969) ("We have no occasion to ascribe
the source of this right to travel interstate to a particular constitutional provision.").
2' See id. at 627.
2 Id. at 634.
23 Note, DurationalResidency Requirementsfrom Shapiro through Sosna. The Right to
Travel Takes a New Turn, 50 N.Y.U. L REV. 622,669 (1975).
254 Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 259 (1974) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
255 Attorney General v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898,909 (1986).
256 Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,406 (1975).
257 Some have argued that the Court should look at the penalty in comparative terms.
Therefore, "a state that grants some benefit or lessens some burden for established residents
must have good reason for falling to do likewise for newcomers." Farrell, supra note 202, at
607. This comparative focus is highly problematic. Most legislation grants a benefit or lessens
a burden, so there is almost always a comparative dissimilitude. If these all become equal protection problems, the Court will be deluged, and legislatures would be unable to pass constitutional laws.
25 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
259 See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 407 (1975) (upholding an Iowa statue which served a
paramount interest of the state); Memorial Hosp., 415 U.S. at 254 (requiring Arizona to justify a
durational residency for receiving free medical care by a showing of a compelling government
interest); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972) (holding that the Tennessee statute
denying the right to vote for a durational period must be justified by a substantial and compelling government interest).
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the scrutiny fence, claiming that "if the statutory scheme cannot pass
even the minimal test proposed by the State, we need not decide
whether any enhanced scrutiny is called for. 2 60 One might think that
this shift from strict scrutiny to a less exacting standard may have
been influenced by the resounding accusations of judicial activism
made against the Warren Court. 6 1 This was apparently not so, however, because Saenz resumed Shapiro's strict scrutiny standard.26 2
In analyzing the right to travel under the Equal Protection
Clause, the Court has been consistent in only two respects. First, the
Court has consistently held that the right to travel is constitutionally
protected. Second, the Court has also consistently held that the Equal
Protection Clause is not the source of that right, notwithstanding the
Court's use of the clause to analyze the cases. As the preceding discussion demonstrates and the Court admits, the Equal Protection
Clause is an unlikely source of the right to travel. It is highly questionable that the clause is the source of any rights.263 It is beyond
question that the clause was never intended to be the source of the
right to travel. 26
1I. A TEXTUAL HOME FOR THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL
As Part II has demonstrated, none of the discussed clauses were
intended to, nor should they now, protect the right to travel. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has claimed, at one time or another, that
each of those clauses, individually or in combination, protects the
right to travel. This zeal to protect the right to travel without identifying its constitutional source has prevented the right from being
260 Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60-61 (1982). The Court has fully embraced
this
straddling position in subsequent cases. See Hooper v. Barnalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S.
612, 618 (1985) ("As in Zobel, if the statutory scheme cannot pass even the minimum rationality
test, our inquiry ends.").
261 See BORK, supranote 129, at 69-100 (arguing that the Warren Court "stands first and
alone as a legislator of policy"). But see Jeffrey Rosen, Hyperactive:How the Right Learned to
Love JudicialActivism, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 31, 2000, at 20 (illustrating how the Court nullified
the Violence Against Women Act as beyond the power of Congress).
262 See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 504 (1999) ("The appropriate
standard may be more
categorical than that articulated in Shapiro,but it is surely no less strict.") (citation omitted).
m Professor Fullinwider argues:
[An explicit rule of constitutional equality, such as the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, does not add anything distinct from and independent of
the other rights (to liberty, security, due process, etc.) already enumerated in or implied by other provisions of the Constitution. Since these other constitutional rights
apply to all citizens, their form already entails their equal application. The explicit
principle of constitutional equality serves only a rhetorical purpose, reminding us of
the nature of other constitutional principles.
ROBERT K. FULLINWIDER, THE REVERSE DISCRIMINATION CONTROVERSY 223 (1980).
264 See Segall, supra note 146, at 493-94 ("In order for the right to travel
to be fundamental, it must have emerged from somewhere else in the Constitution. Thus, while equal protection analysis is used in right to travel cases, there is no reason to believe that the Equal Protection Clause is the source of the right to travel.") (footnote omitted).
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found in the appropriate text, the Comity Clause and the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. Occasionally, individual members of the Court
have put forth such arguments, but the Court has not embraced them.
In Saenz, however, the Court appeared to have made a giant leap towards a forthright discussion concerning the right and its proper textual source. Unfortunately, Saenz's initial shine wears off and it becomes clear that Saenz failed to engage in a complete discussion of
the right to travel, adding yet more confusion to established right-totravel jurisprudence.
This section will inquire into the origin and meanings of privileges and immunities and show that they encompass the right to
travel. Finding that the right to travel is a privilege or immunity, this
section will put forth a test for determining whether state laws have
abridged the right. Then, the test will be applied to some of the right
to travel case previously decided to illustrate how the test works.
A. The Origins and Meaning of Privilegesand Immunities
In his dissent in Saenz, Justice Thomas inquired into the origins
Other than Justice
and meaning of "privileges and immunities."2
Thomas' inquiry, the Supreme Court has gone to little trouble to inquire or explain the origins and intended meaning of "privileges and
immunities," especially in relation to the right to travel. Only after
inquiring into and embracing the meaning of "privileges and immunities" will the Court be able to provide substance to the Comity Clause
and the Privileges or Immunities Clause, thereby providing a forthright protection of the right to travel.
1. The Originof the Comity Clause
Privileges and immunities are mentioned only once in the original
text of the Constitution. The Comity Clause, Article IV, section 2,
states: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States. 266 Article IV of the
Articles of Confederation provided the model for this constitutional
provision:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and
intercourse among the people of the different States in this
Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States (paupers,
vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted) shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the
several States; and the people of each State shall have free
2 See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 521 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Unlike the majority, I would look
to history to ascertain the original meaning of the Clause.").
266 U.S. CONST. artLIV, § 2.
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ingress and egress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject
to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively .... 267
At the Constitutional Convention, Charles Pinckney, the drafter of
Article IV of the Constitution, stated that the Comity Clause was
"formed exactly upon the principles of the 4th article of the present
Confederation. 2 68
While there is no doubt that Article IV of the Articles of Confederation is the origin of Comity Clause, it is less than clear if all, or just
a portion, of the principles in the Articles of Confederation were imported into the Comity Clause. If the Comity Clause were intended to
incorporate all of Article IV, interpretive problems would arise. Article IV sets forth two distinct and mutually exclusive principles. The
first segment of Article IV entitles free inhabitants "to all privileges
and immunities of free citizens in the several States. 269 Paupers,
vagabonds, and fugitives are exempted from this entitlement. 270 The
second segment of Article IV sets forth a separate principle; that is,
those in a state other than their own are afforded an equality of commercial privileges and immunities with those of the state visited.
Thus, there is a stark contrast between the two principles. The former
is an entitlement to privileges and immunities no matter where the
person is currently situated, so long as they are not paupers, vagabonds, or fugitives. The later prevents states from discriminating
against foreign persons conducting commerce within the state. There
is no language within the Comity Clause to suggest that it incorporates both distinct principles. Consequently, the Comity Clause must
incorporate only a portion of Article IV.
It only makes sense to argue that the Comity Clause incorporates
that portion of Article IV most similar to it. "[T]he free inhabitants of
each of these states, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice
excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free
citizens of the several states" is markedly similar to the Comity
267 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IV.

3 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 112
(1937). Pinckney's comment should not be taken as the intended meaning of the delegates of
the Constitutional Convention. In fact, little can be said as to the delegates' intended meaning.
See David S. Bogen, The Privilegesand Immunities Clause of Article IV, 37 CASE W. RES. L
REV. 794, 795-6 (1987) ("There is virtually no report of significant discussion of the clause's
meaning prior to its adoption in the Constitution.").
269 ARTICLEs OF CONFEDERATION, art. IV.
270 If a person was a "pauper[], vagabond[],

[or] fugitive[] from justice," then the Articles
did not entitle that person to any privileges and immunities that would be protected against state
action. Id. See also Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 156 (Story, J., dissenting) (arguing that, according to this interpretation, states may "have a right to pass poor laws,
and laws to prevent the introduction of paupers").
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Clause. But the two clauses are not carbon copies. Instead of Article
IV's "free inhabitants" and "free citizens," the Comity Clause speaks
of "Citizens." Instead of exempting "paupers, vagabonds, and fugi.tives" from entitlement to privileges and immunities, the Comity
Clause fails to mention any exceptions. Otherwise, the language and
the principle of the clauses are identical. Both are aimed at entitling
citizens to privileges and immunities irrespective of the state the citizen is situated in. Therefore, interpreting the Comity Clause as based
upon a portion of Article IV, but not incorporating all of Article IV, is
more in accordance with the language of the Comity Clause and less
an affront to our belief that "peoples of the several states must sink or
swim together." 271
2. The Originof the Privilegesor Immunities Clause
The origin of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is even clearer than is the origin of the Comity
Clause. The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, was a direct
refutation of Dred Scott v. Sandford.272 In Dred Scott, Chief Justice
Taney declared that blacks were never and could never become citizens of the United States.273 As blacks were not entitled to citizenship, they were unable to pursue legal claims in federal court (the issue presented in Dred Scott) and more importantly, were forever outside the purview of the Comity Clause.274 The Citizenship Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment was a direct refutation of Taney's holding
in Dred Scott.275 It was hoped that a constitutional amendment, forever granting citizenship to those born or naturalized in the United
States, would prevent a repeat of Dred Scott. The rest of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Privileges or Immunities, Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses, should be seen as a reiteration by extrapolation of the Comity Clause. As citizens, the freedmen were entitled
to privileges and immunities that could not be abridged by any state.
3. The Meaning of Privilegesand Immunities
While this Note argues that the right to travel was originally considered a privilege or immunity protected by the Comity Clause and
that this was reiterated in the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, a limited inquiry into the scope and meaning
of privileges and immunities is appropriate. There are two divergent
schools of thought concerning the meaning of the phrase "privileges
and immunities." One school argues that the clause refers to natural
271 Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511,523 (1935).

m 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).

273 See id.
at 426-27.
274 See id.

275 See supra notes 203-209 and accompanying text.
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law, that is, the fundamental rights possessed by all men at all times,
which no government may ever deprive or abridge. 276 The other
school of thought argues that the clause prevents only discriminatory
state action.277
The fundamental rights-natural law school argues that the scope
of privileges and immunities was finite and connoted a fixed, identifiable meaning until the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.27 8 As
Professor Antieau has demonstrated, the Comity Clause was a gapfiller in the political process of states. 279 In the era preceding the ratification of the Constitution, "[ilt was the unspoken assumption...
that no state could ever justifiably deny its own citizens their natural
rights. '280 A state's citizens were the locus of political power who
had fought in defense of their natural rights and were not about 28
to
allow their elected officers to trample those newly secured rights. '
Non-citizens within the jurisdiction of the state, however, were in
jeopardy of having their natural rights trampled, as they possessed no
political voice. Moreover, citizens had little motivation to look out
for the rights of non-citizens, and officeholders were motivated to
trample non-citizens' rights. This predicament was exactly the motivation behind the Comity Clause. In fact, the clause
282 was the only
protection afforded to non-citizens from such abuses.
In Federalist No. 80, Alexander Hamilton implicitly endorsed the
fundamental rights-natural law view of privileges and immunities.
Hamilton characterized the Comity Clause as the "esteemed... basis
of the Union.,' 283 As the clause was intended to ensure an "equality of
privileges and immunities to which the citizens of the Union will be
entitled," Hamilton maintained that states could not be trusted to pro276

See, e.g., MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE 100 (1986) (arguing that

the Framers incorporated a fundamental rights view into the Privileges or Immunities Clause);
Clarence Thomas, The HigherLaw Background of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 63, 63-67 (1989) (arguing that a natural
law theory of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is not only historically warranted, but is also
the best defense of limited government, separation of powers, and judicial restraint).
m See, e.g., John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privilegesor Immunities Clause, 101 YALE
LJ. 1385, 1473-74 (1992) (arguing that the Privileges or Immunities Clause is an antidiscrimination provision).
278

See CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, THE INTENDED SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENT 317 (1997) ("In all the years from then until the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868,
it was the general view in the nation that this protected the natural fundamental rights, including
the right to travel or freedom of movement."). In fact, the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the restrictive interpretation given to its Privileges or Immunities Clause, led to the
current confusion as to the scope and meaning of the Comity Clause. See Baker, supra note 39,
at 1141.
279 See Chester James Antieau, Paul's Perverted Privileges or the True Meaning of the
Privilegesand Immunities Clause ofArticle Four,9 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1 (1967).
280 Id. at 5.
281 See id.
m See id.
23 THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 478 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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tect fundamental rights. 284 Hamilton believed that the national judiciary, however, "having no local attachments, will be likely to be impartial between the different States and their citizens., 285 In essence,
Hamilton theorized that, because of self-interest, states would become
hostile to the protection of non-citizen's privileges and immunities
and that the Comity Clause would enable the national judiciary to
protect fundamental rights.
Rarely has anyone attempted to enumerate those rights considered fundamental. In Corfield v. Coryell,286 however, Justice Bushrod
Washington made such an attempt. The New Jersey statute at issue in
Corfield proscribed non-residents from gathering oysters. The court
rejected a challenge to the statute that claimed that it was an abridgement of the Comity Clause. In ascertaining whether oyster fishing
was a fundamental right, Justice Washington provided a list of fundamental rights:
[T]hose privileges and immunities which are, in their nature,
fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free
governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by
the citizens of the several states which compose this Union,
from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may,
however, be all comprehended under the following general
heads: ... The right of a citizen of one state to pass through,
or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professionalpursuits, or otherwise .... These, and
many others which might be mentioned, are, strictly speaking, privileges and immunities, and the enjoyment of them by
the citizens of each state, in every other state, was manifestly
calculated (to use the expressions of the preamble of the corresponding provision in the old articles of confederation) "the
better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse
among the people of the different states of the Un, 287
ion.
Justice Washington's list of fundamental rights has often been
cited and relied upon by later courts, and it has never been rejected
outright by the Supreme Court. The Court, however, has never explicitly adopted this sweeping inventory of fundamental rights in a
Comity Clause case. In Ward v. Maryland,2 88 the Court made refer284
285

id.
d

6 F. Cas. 546 (Washington, Circuit Justice 1823).
Id. at 551-52 (quoting ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IV) (emphasis added).
2us 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1871).
2'

27
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ence to fundamental rights, declaring that the Comity Clause protects
the right of non-residents to enter states "for the purpose of engaging
in lawful commerce .... ; to acquire personal property; to take and
hold real estate; to maintain actions in the courts of the State; and to
be exempt from any higher taxes or excises than are imposed by the
State upon its own citizens. 289 Just two years later, however, in the
Slaughter-House Cases, 290 the Court was asked to determine the
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities
Clause. Slaughter-House,which came before the Court only a short
time after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, involved a
state monopoly granted to one New Orleans slaughterhouse. Butchers excluded from the monopoly challenged the statute, claiming that
Louisiana had abridged their privileges and immunities. 291 In dismissing the butchers' claim, the Court held that the Privileges or Immunities Clause added nothing to the Constitution and referred to the
same rights enumerated in Corfield.29 z Under this interpretation, then,
federal protection of fundamental rights was limited to those situations in which a state interfered with the rights of national citizenship,
which were few. 293 In sum, "with the exception of [prohibitions
against ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, and laws impairing the
obligation of contracts], the entire domain of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the States... lay within the constitutional and
legislative power of the States, and without that of the Federal government. , 294
This extremely narrow view of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause has been widely condemned. In his Slaughter-House dissent,
'89

id. at 430.

290

83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).

291
292

See id. at 66.

See id. at 76. The Court then stated that privileges and immunities were those rights
that are "'fundamental; which belong of right to the citizens of all free governments, and which
have at all times been enjoyed by citizens of the several States which compose this Union, from
the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign."' Id. (quoting Corfield, 6 F. Cas.
at 551).
293 See id. at 78-79. In interpreting the privileges and immunities protected by the Comity
Clause, the Court held that the clause offered no protection from state governments. Its purpose
was

to declare to the several States, that whatever those rights, as you grant or establish
them to your own citizens, or as you limit or qualify, or impose restrictions on their
exercise, the same, neither more nor less, shall by the measure of the rights of citizens of other States within your jurisdiction.
Id. at 77. See also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALrrY OF CONSENT 43 (1975) ("[Ihe
rights themselves did not depend on the federal government for their existence or protection.
Their definition and their limitation lay within the power of the states.").
Among the rights concomitant with national citizenship that Justice Miller enumerated
were the rights to come to the seat of government, to assert claims against it, to have access to
its seaports, courts, and offices, to have protection abroad, to assemble and petition, to use navigable waters, and to become a citizen of another State by residence. See Slaughter-House, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79.
234Slaughter-House,83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 77.
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Justice Field claimed that the Court had emasculated the clause, rendering it "a vain and idle enactment.' '295 Justice Field found the
meaning of the clause quite evident: "In the first section of the Civil
Rights Act Congress has iven its interpretation to these terms." 29 6 In
Adamson v. California,29 Justice Black argued thatSlaughter-House
marked a tolerance for state regulation of business activities and a
"failure to carry out the avowed purpose of the Amendment's sponsors." 298 Scholars have similarly criticized the narrow interpretation
given to the Privileges or Immunities Clause by the Slaughter-House
Court. They have argued that the clause affords residents and nonresidents more protection from state governments than that recog29 9
nized in Slaughter-House.
If the Supreme Court were to construe this "privileges and im-

munities" language to protect fundamental rights, this would create
the risk that such language "will become yet another convenient tool

for inventing new rights, limited solely by the 'predilections of those

who happen at the time to be Members of [the] Court.' 30° Although
this risk is real, given that fundamental rights have been protected
under the Court's equal protection and due process jurisprudence,
some have expressed hope that "the Court's revival of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause and its use of a methodological textualism invite a reconsideration of the Court's strict scrutiny protection of civil
rights in its equal protection and due process fundamental rights ju-

29S

kdLat 96 (Field, ., dissenting). For the terms of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, see supra

note 236; infra note 299.
296 Slaughter-House,83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 96 (delineating fundamental rights as the right
to contract, sue, and own and possess property).
297 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
IId. at 81 (Black, J., dissenting).
299See, e.g., ELY, supra note 129, at 24 ("The Privileges or Immunities Clause... seems
to announce rather plainly that there is a set of entitlements that no state is to take away ....
");
Harrison, supranote 277, at 1387 ("The main point of the clause is to require that every state
give the same privileges and immunities of state citizenship--the same positive law rights of
property, contract, and so forh-to all of its citizens."); Donahue, supra note 202, at 470
nn.104-06 ("[Tihe Slaughter-HouseCases basically eviscerated this clause by holding that it
only protected citizens from state interference with the privileges or immunities of national
citizenship.") (footnote omitted).
Professor Berger maintains that the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment should be taken from the Civil Rights Act of 1866. See BERGER,
supranote 170, at 30 ('T]he key to its meaning is furnished by the immediately preceding Civil
Rights Act of 1866, which, all are agreed, it was the purpose of the Amendment to embody and
protect.") (footnote omitted). The Civil Rights Act referred to the following fundamental rights:
personal security, freedom of locomotion, and ownership and disposition of property. See id. at
31. While Berger's privileges and immunities seem narrower than those proclaimed by Justice
Washington in Corfield, Berger contends otherwise. When discussing Justice Washington's list
of rights, Berger states that, on the whole, "these are the privileges and immunities enumerated
in the Civil Rights Bill." liaat 40.
300 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 528 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,502 (1977)).
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risprudence. 3 °! Professor Tribe has argued that those fundamental
rights represented by privileges and immunities are not "co-extensive
with the . . . fundamental interests recognized by equal protection
doctrine." 30 2 Whatever the distinction between fundamental rights
represented by privileges and immunities and those recognized by
equal protection, there is some cause for concern.
Possibly in an effort to subjugate the fundamental rights risk, the
anti-discriminatory school maintains that privileges and immunities
are readily identifiable as those which are granted by each individual
state to its own citizens. Professor Bogen concurs in Professor Antieau's basic premise that political union required a special obligation
of states to non-citizens.
However, he differs with Professor Antieau in holding that "history shows the privileges and immunities
were to be based on those found in each state separately, rather than
an abstraction common to all states." 3°4 Professor Bogen concedes
that much of the rhetoric leading up to the Articles of Confederation
and the Constitution spoke of natural law and fundamental rights.
But he maintains that when Englishmen decried the deprivation of
natural rights, they were speaking about rights guaranteed to them by
positive law in England, which were independently thought of as
grounded in natural law.30 5 In essence, then, fundamental rights talk
was more effectual in stirring unrest against the English government
than appeals to positive law.
In Paul v. Virginia,30 6 the Supreme Court adopted the antidiscriminatory approach to the Comity Clause. Even though Chief
Justice Taney had previously held in Dred Scott that the purpose of
the Comity Clause was to prevent states from abusing citizens and
non-citizens alike,30 7 the Paul Court held that the privileges and immunities possessed by a citizen of one state sojourning in another
were those recognized by the second state for its own citizens. 30 8 In
dicta, Justice Field, however, went further:
It was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to
place the citizens of each State upon the same footing with
citizens of other States, so far as the advantages resulting
301 Tim A. Lemper, The Promise and Perilsof 'Privilegesand Immunities': Saenz v. Roe,
119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999), 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 295, 319 (1999).
302 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 535 (2d ed. 1988).
3 See Bogen, supra note 268, at 795 ("The principle that states have a special obligation
to the citizens of other states was crucial in developing a common national identity.").
30 Id. at 843.
30 See id. at 844.
3
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869).
"7 See Antieau, supra note 279, at 13 ("The privileges and immunities of Article Four,
[Chief Justice Taney] assuredly attests, are not to hinge upon what any state thought them to
be.").
3m See Paul,75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 180.
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from citizenship in those States are concerned. It relieves
them from the disabilities of alienage in other States; it inhibits discriminating legislation against them by other States;
it gives them the right of free ingress into other States, and
egress from them; it insures to them in other States the same
freedom possessed by the citizens of those States in the acquisition and enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of
happiness; and it secures to them in other States the equal

protection of their laws. It has been justly said that no provision in the Constitution has tended so strongly to3 °constitute
9
the citizens of the United States one people as this.
Notwithstanding the sweep of Justice Field's language, this understanding foreclosed the Comity Clause's protection of "the common
rights of free citizens. 3 10 Instead, the Clause would protect only
those rights afforded by the state in question. 11 Thus, residents of a
state have no recourse in claiming their privileges and immunities
have been abridged. States are free to provide or deny any benefit as
they see fit, as privileges and immunities only require that the benefits
granted to citizens be granted to non-citizens as well. As then-Justice
Rehnquist would later pronounce: "That Clause assures that nonresidents of a State shall enjoy the same privileges and immunities as
residents... [and] has no
312application to a citizen of the State whose

laws are complained of."

This anti-discrimination rationale effectively read the Privileges
or Immunities Clause out of the Constitution, because the Equal Pro3 13
tection Clause also prohibits discrimination. In Slaughter-House,
the Court acknowledged the fundamental rights meaning of privileges

and immunities, but held that only nonresidents could complain of a
309id
310

Antieau, supra note 279, at 22.

31 See id. In Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948), the Court enunciated a test for de-

termining whether a state has failed to respect the privileges and immunities of a non-resident.
The test first asks whether nonresidents targeted by a state law "constitute a peculiar source of
the evil at which the statute is aimed.' Id-at 398. If the nonresidents do not constitute a peculiar source of evil, the Comity Clause will not have been violated unless the law burdens an
"essential activity" or the exercise of a "basic right." Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436
U.S. 371, 387 (1978). See alsb New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 283 (1985) (holding
that a state law restricting bar admission to state residents violated the Comity Clause); Hicklin
v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 526-27 (1978) (holding that a state law containing a one-year durational residency requirement for employment purposes was invalid under the Comity Clause).
Some have argued that the Toomer test is too lenient upon states. See Wildenthal, supra
note 248, at 1592-93 ("Any discrimination among a state's citizens on the basis of nonresidence
at some point in the past, irrespective of the interest affected by the discrimination, [should] be
subject to strict scrutiny and sustained only if closely related to the achievement of a compelling
state interest; the existence of any less restrictive alternative would invalidate such discrimination.").
312 Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 84 n.3 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
313 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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state's laws. Thereafter, neither the Court nor Congress would intervene on behalf of a citizen against her own state to enforce the citizen's rights.
4. The Right to Travel is a Privilegeor Immunity
Although the precise meaning of "privileges and immunities" is
critically important, resolving the debate is beyond the purview of this
Note. For purposes of this Note, it is important to recognize that both
schools of thought understand the right to travel as a privilege or immunity. Under the fundamental rights-natural law school, the right to
travel -314
has always been considered a right no government may deny or
disparage.
The right to travel has always been deemed fundamental.315 Similarly, Professor Bogen, advocate of the anti-discrimination
perspective, concedes that privileges and immunities include the right
to travel. He has traced the right to travel through colonial charters,
in which the king promised his colonial subjects various "liberties,
privileges, franchises, and immunities in every other colony as if born
in England or that colony., 31 6 These entitlements included the right
to travel, to become a member of another colony, to own property,
engage in discrimination-free trade, and various other rights vested in
colonial members. 3 17 Once colonists' link to England was broken by
independence, these rights were put in jeopardy. Article IV of the
Articles of Confederation and, later, the Comity Clause of the Constitution, can be understood as playing the same role as the colonial
charters.318
B. Protectingthe Rightfrom State Abridgement: One Workable
Analysis Is Worth Two Unworkable Analyses in Precedent
As the right to travel is a privilege or immunity, it must be determined how the Court should protect it from state abridgement.
Exactly how the Court should do so is not mandated by the text of the
Constitution. The Comity Clause merely entitles citizens to privileges and immunities, while the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
states from abridging privileges or immunities. The Court has advanced two methods of analysis involving the privileges and immuni314 See supra text accompanying notes 278-302.

See BERGER, supranote 170, at 31.
Bogen, supranote 268, at 817.
317 See id.
318 Bogen asserts that the Comity Clause invests more protections for the non-resident than
315
316

did the Articles of Confederation. While the Articles of Confederation imposed obligations
upon states to non-residents, the overwhelming power in Congress of states (unanimity of states
necessary to pass legislation) gave little practical effect to the provision. However, under the
Comity Clause and the limited power of individual states in the Constitution, the national government took the place of the king in colonial times, uniting the states under a single citizenship.
See id. at 832.
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ties clauses. Neither of those analyses adequately protect the right to
travel because they are difficult to apply and are unwarranted by the
language and history of the clauses. This Note advances a third approach that protects all aspects of the right, is easy to apply, and is
faithful to the language and text of the Constitution.
1. Two UnworkableAnalyses
The Court has followed two approaches in protecting the right to
travel. The first is that employed by the Court in Saenz. Saenz dissected the right to travel into three components: the rights to visit, to
pass through, and to migrate to another state. The Court held that the
right to visit is protected by the Comity Clause and that the right to
migrate is protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. 319 The
Court held that the right to pass through is not protected by the text of
the Constitution, but the Court protected it nevertheless. 2 As previously argued, the origins and meaning of the clauses concerning
privileges and immunities are of the same genus and do not warrant
separate jurisprudential doctrines. 32' Additionally, the penalty analysis for determining whether the right to travel has been abridged is, at
best, unwarranted by the Constitution, and at worst, unhelpful and
unworkable judicial legislation.32 2
Even if these criticisms of the Saenz test as applied are not persuasive, a cursory reading of Saenz makes clear that the Court was
simply applying equal protection analysis to California's welfare
scheme. The Court discussed the appropriate level of scrutiny to be
applied to the scheme and decided upon the same level as that applied
in Shapiro, a case undeniably analyzed under the Equal Protection
Clause. Assuming, for argument's sake, that modem equal protection
analysis is constitutionally appropriate, 323 the privileges and immunities analysis should not be the same. Otherwise, the Privileges or
Immunities Clause again becomes superfluous, this time not because
of Slaughter-House'spoor reasoning, but because the Court has failed
to construct an analysis under the Privileges or Immunities Clause
different from equal protection analysis.
The' Court's other approach to protecting the right to travel was
advocated by Justice O'Connor. In Zobel v. Williams 32 4 Justice
O'Connor concurred in the Court's holding that an Alaska statute in-

319 See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501-04 (1999).
320 See id.
321

See supra Part III.A.

322 See supra notes 252-57 and accompanying text.
323 See supra Part ILF.3.
324 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
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fringed upon the right to migrate. 5 Justice O'Connor's concurrence
differed from the majority, however, regarding the constitutional location of this aspect of the right to travel. 326 She reasoned that the
Comity Clause was the source of the right because it was intended to
"'insure to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same
privileges which the citizens of State B enjoy.' ' 327 Because Alaska
was denying benefits-which O'Connor construed as privilegesbased upon length of residency, Alaska had violated the Comity
Clause.3 8
Similar to the Saenz's test, Justice O'Connor's analysis, based on
the Toomer test, is unsatisfactory. This is not because it renders the
Privileges or Immunities Clause superfluous as the Saenz analysis
does, but because it fails to protect the right to migrate. Justice
O'Connor's general statement of the purpose of the Comity Clause
implies protection short of migration. "Venturing into State B" connotes something similar to visitation or passing through, far less than
entering State B with all earthly possessions and intending to remain
indefinitely. Additionally, the analysis asks whether a state law has
discriminated against a non-resident. Once non-residents enter a state
to reside, the Citizenship Clause transforms them into citizens of a
state in which they reside. 32 9 Therefore, only non-residents venturing
into a state to visit or pass-through, and not to reside, would be protected under this approach.
The final weakness inherent in Justice O'Connor's proposed test
is that it is based solely in the Comity Clause, which Chief Justice
Taney interpreted as excluding blacks from ever becoming citizens
and being entitled to privileges and immunities. 330 There is no doubt
that Chief Justice Taney was wrong. The Fourteenth Amendment is
the constitutional proof of Taney's incorrectness. By its ratification,
the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to forever prevent subsequent decisions similar to DredScott.
Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment, in a sense, replaced the
Comity Clause and indeed strengthened its prohibitions. To give the
Comity Clause an independent meaning, as Justice O'Connor does,
disregards the Fourteenth Amendment. Because Justice O'Connor
325 The Court had previously held that those aspects of the right to travel exercised by nonresidents, the rights to travel through and to visit, were protected by the Comity Clause. See
supranote 311.
326 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger failed to declare the source for the right, but
found that because Alaska "distribute[d] benefits unequally, the distinctions it makes are subject
to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Zobel, 457 U.S.
at 61 n.6.
327 Id. at 74 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395
(1948)).
328 See id. at 73.
329 See supra Part II.F.1.
330 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,426-27 (1856).
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and the Court refuse to give credence to the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, the Constitution's guarantee of privileges and immunities will
not be realized appropriately.
2. One Workable Analysis
As the weaknesses of the two unworkable analyses demonstrate,
any test for determining whether the right to travel has been abridged
must be couched primarily in the Privileges or Immunities Clause. In
determining whether to include the Comity Clause, one must consider
the effect of Dred Scott and the Fourteenth Amendment upon the
clause. If Dred Scott is understood as an obliteration of the Comity
Clause, the Privileges or Immunities Clause overruled Dred Scott and
replaced the Comity Clause. If, on the other hand, Dred Scott simply
misconstrued the Comity Clause, the Privileges or Immunities Clause
reaffirmed the Comity Clause. In either instance, the Comity Clause
merely enhances the more current Privileges and Immunities Clause.
Unfortunately, the Privileges or Immunities Clause suffers from
its own weaknesses. Even in the face of continual vilification,
Slaughter-Househas shackled the Privileges or Immunities Clause for
over a century.3 31 Without discussing its constitutional demise, the
Court resurrected the clause in Saenz. The Court drew from Slaughter-House: "it has always been common ground that [the Privileges or
Immunities Clause] protects the third component of the right to
travel," the right to migrate.332 In fact, the Court even quoted from
the Slaughter-House opinion: "'[A] citizen of the United States can,
of his own volition, become a citizen of any State of the Union by a
bona fide residence therein, with the same rights as other citizens of
that State.' ' 333 While the Court's willingness to discuss SlaughterHouse in Saenz sparks a glimmer of hope that the right to travel and
331The Privileges or Immunities Clause was relied upon by the Court only once prior to
Saenz. See Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935), overruled by Madden v. Kentucky, 309
U.S. 83 (1940). Individual members of the Court have cited the clause as a likely source for the
right to travel, however. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 666-69 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (contending that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects the right of interstate
travel and migration against state interference, but concluding that the statute in question was
valid since Congress had authorized the penalty); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177, 185
(1941) (Douglas, J., concurring) (Jackson, J., concurring) (arguing that the right to travel was
part of national citizenship and could not be infringed under the Privileges or Immunities
Clause).
332Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489,503 (1999).
333Id (quoting The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 80 (1873)). Justice
Stevens, emphasizing the universal agreement that the Privilege or Immunities Clause irotected
the right to migrate, quoted Justice Bradley's dissent in Slaughter-House:
A citizen of the United States has a perfect constitutional right to go to and resi le in
any State he chooses, and to claim citizenship therein, and an equality of right, with
every other citizen; and the whole power of the nation is pledged to sustain him in
that right.
i at 503-04 (quoting Slaughter-House,83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 112-13 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
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other privileges and immunities will be protected by their legitimate
constitutional clause, the Court must come forth and "kill Slaughterhouse [sic] once and for all" if it expects outsiders to take the Court
seriously.3
Only after removing the Slaughter-Houseroadblock from Privileges or Immunities Clause jurisprudence will the Court be able to
construct a straightforward rule for determining whether the right to
travel has been abridged by a state law. As designated by the language of the Fourteenth Amendment, only state law would be subject
to privileges and immunities analysis.33 Under this analysis, only
state laws directly impairing the right to travel, whether visiting,
passing-through or migrating, would be declared unconstitutional.
The Court would first ask whether the challenged law affects interstate travel. If the Court concludes that the law does not, then it could
not be held to abridge the right to travel. If, on the other hand, the
law does affect interstate travel, the Court would next ask whether the
law erects barriers to interstate travel or discriminates against out-ofstate travelers. If the law erects such barriers or discriminated in this
way, then the law would be held unconstitutional, no matter the
state's justification.
This analysis improves upon the analysis discussed in Bray v.
Alexandria Women's Health Clinic.336 In Bray, pro-life demonstrators protested in proximity to an abortion clinic, making it difficult to
for women seeking abortions to enter the clinic. Some of those
women had come from out-of-state and alleged that their right to
travel had been abridged by the protestors. The Court held that there
was no abridgement of the right to travel because, as Justice Scalia
reasoned, the right of interstate travel "protects interstate travelers
against two sets of burdens: the erection of actual barriers to interstate
movement and being treated differently from intrastate travelers. 337
Therefore, because no state law erected a barrier to interstate movement or treated out-of-state travelers differently, the right to travel
had not been abridged.338 The Bray analysis suffers in that there is no
inquiry into whether a state law dealing with travel was implicated.
Notwithstanding Bray's failure to inquire into this issue, the Court
arrived at the correct outcome.
34 Akhil Reed Amar, Lost Clause, NEW REPUBLIC, June 14, 1999, at 15. Professor Tribe
is skeptical that Saenz portends new constitutional jurisprudence. See Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz
Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immunities Revival Portendthe Future-orReveal the
Structure of the Present?, 113 HARV. L. REv. 110 (1999).
3-5 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
336 506 U.S. 263 (1993).
337 Il at 277 (quoting Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 n.6 (1982)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). See also Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948); Paul v. Virginia, 75
U.S. (8Wall.) 168, 180 (1869).
331 See Bray, 506 U.S. at 277.
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The analysis advanced in this Note is superior to both the Saenz
test and Justice O'Connor' S.339 The analysis applies only to state laws
directly impairing travel. The Court would no longer question
whether the law constitutes a penalty. 340 Even the most carefully
drafted law affects actions outside the intended scope of the law.
Those laws having incidental effects upon travel may be unconstitutional, but not because they abridge the right to travel. Additionally,
it is a prophylactic rule as required by the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which declares that "[n]o state shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States. '341 This language does not suggest any inquiry
into the reasonableness of the law or the balancing of the government's interest against the individual's interest to determine the constitutionality of the law. If a state law abridges the right to travel, the
law would be unconstitutional. Accordingly, the rule relieves the judiciary from inquiring into the propriety of laws, traditionally a legislative function. 342 An additional benefit is its ease of application.
This rule is much easier to apply than either the Saenz rule or that
proposed by Justice O'Connor.
C. The ProposedAnalysis Applied
This Note has argued that the Court's right-to-travel jurisprudence has been confused and wrong-headed. It does not follow, however, that the Court's right-to-travel precedents must all be overturned. Instead, the Court's prior right-to-travel cases should be reevaluated based upon the analysis advanced in this Note. Under this
approach, some state laws previously held unconstitutional would
remain unconstitutional, but others would be deemed constitutional.
What will differ between the previous approaches and that advanced
in this Note is the Supreme Court's role in determining the constitutionality of the challenged state laws. This different approach restrains the Court's nine-headed Caesar tendencies by ensuring, in
right-to-travel cases, that the proper constitutional provision is invoked and a rule faithful to the text, structure, and history of the Constitution is employed.
Without question, the laws challenged in Crandall and Edwards
would still be held unconstitutional under the analysis advanced in
this Note. In Crandall,the State of Nevada taxed persons leaving the
state.343 In answering the first question of the proposed analysis, it is
clear that this statute affected travel by actually taxing the physical act
339See supra Part II.B.1.
340See supra notes 252-57 and accompanying text.
34 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
342See supra note 43.
343See Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35,39 (1867).
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of leaving the state. Next, the analysis questions whether the law
erected a barrier to interstate movement or discriminated against outof-state travelers. The Nevada law does not discriminate, but it does
erect a barrier. A tax upon leaving or entering a state is a barrier to
interstate movement. If an individual cannot pay the tax, they could
not legally exit the state. Clearly, the right to travel has been abridged
by Nevada. Once the Court determines that the right has been
abridged, the judicial inquiry would end. Nevada could not justify the
law by offering a compelling or important governmental interest for
it.
The California statute at issue in Edwards would similarly be
deemed unconstitutional. The State of California imposed criminal
penalties upon anyone who knowingly brought into or assisted in
bringing an indigent person into the state.3 " It is clear that the statute
deals with travel, but the statute is somewhat more problematic than
that in Crandall. California criminalized only the assisting persons,
not the indigent assisted. The statute, however, clearly created a barrier to the entry of indigents. Indigents by definition need help and
have little economic means to move about. 345 By preventing others
from assisting them into the state, the law erected a barrier to indigents entering California. Therefore, the statute is unconstitutional,
no matter the justification.
If Supreme Court cases are representative of state statutes, the
types of statutes at issue in Crandall and Edwards, creating barriers to
interstate travel, are of little concern to travelers today. Crandallwas
decided in 1868, Edwards in 1941. The Supreme Court has not been
presented with a similar state statute since. This is not to say, however, that state statutes have not abridged the right to travel since
1941. Numerous cases since 1941 have held state statutes unconstitutional as abridging the right to travel because they have penalized
the right to travel. Under the analysis advanced in this Note, some of
those cases were correctly decided. Others were decided incorrectly
because the statutes at issue did not deal with travel.
In reviewing these statutes, one must remember that merely favoring in-state residents over out-of-state visitors does not necessarily
abridge the right to travel. To actually abridge the right to travel, the
statute must directly affect travel. Only with this in mind can Saenz
be properly analyzed. In Saenz, California limited welfare benefits to
those residing in the state for less than twelve months. During this
period, the recipient's benefits would be limited to the amount obtainable in the recipient's prior state of residence. The question presented

3

See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 165-66 (1941).

345 Indigent is defined as "needy, poor."

THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT
ENGLISH 692 (Della Thompson ed., 9th ed. 1995).
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by this temporary limitation of benefits is whether the limitation affects travel.
In one sense, the limitation clearly affects travel. In modem society, welfare benefits make up a sizeable portion of state business.
States have limited resources for welfare programs and have an avid
interest in limiting the number of those receiving such benefits.
Therefore, welfare denial statutes directly affect travel in one of two
ways: (1) the state hopes to deter welfare dependent non-residents
from moving into the state because of the denial; or (2) the state saves
a portion of those limited resources each year by not granting benefits
to those who decided to move without knowledge that they will receive no benefits for one year, or perhaps in spite of that knowledge.
The states' hope for impairment upon interstate travel is far from
direct, however. Many new residents move into a state with a steady
income, only to become welfare dependent within their first year of
residency because of some unforeseeable tragedy or incident. A family tragedy or economic downturn may force individuals to seek welfare benefits. At best, the effect of the Saenz statute impairs interstate
travel only indirectly. Accordingly, the Saenz statute would not constitute an abridgement of the right to travel.
One could argue that even if Saenz's temporary limitation of
benefits is constitutional, the complete denial of benefits in Shapiro
makes those statutes unconstitutional. Shapiro dealt with state statutes denying welfare benefits to persons residing within the states for
less than one year3 46 The distinction between limiting and denying
welfare benefits does not change the fact that none of the statutes directly impair interstate travel. Consequently, the statutes in Shapiro
would not be held unconstitutional as an abridgement of the right to
travel.
Tennessee imposed a residency requirement upon voting that
was challenged in Dunn v. Blumstein.34 The focus of the Court's
inquiry should be whether the residency requirement directly dealt
with interstate travel. More than the Shapiro statute, a residency requirement applicable to all persons recently moving into a state, not
just those who are welfare eligible, impairs the right to interstate
travel. Everyone who moves into the state is unable to vote. Notwithstanding, ineligibility to vote based upon interstate travel does
not directly deal with travel. Using interstate travel as criteria for
voter eligibility has no relation to the physical act of interstate travel.
As Tennessee argued in Dunn, there was no showing that the residency requirement deterred interstate travel. 48 If no one has been
346See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 621-22 (1969).
-7 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
34'See id. at 339.
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deterred from moving into the state, it would be intellectually dishonest to say that the statute directly impaired that same interstate movement. Therefore,
the statute would not abridge the right to interstate
49
movement.
In Zobel v. Williams3 50 and Hooper v. Bernalillo County Asses35
sor, 1 the Supreme Court held that state statutes granting benefits
based upon length of residency were unconstitutional. In Zobel,
Alaska distributed income from its permanent fund to residents based
upon their length of residency within the state. Those who were residents in 1959 received the largest share. Those who established residency in 1960 received the next largest share and so on for each successive year. Does this distribution scheme directly deal with interstate travel? Clearly, it does not. As evidence, the scheme would
have no deterrent effect on interstate travel. No one considering a
move to Alaska would be deterred from moving there by this statutory scheme. In fact, the scheme encourages people to move into the
state. Those who were residents of Alaska would not be directly impaired. Although their share of the permanent fund would be forfeited if they decided to migrate to another state, this forfeiture cannot
be characterized as directly dealing with interstate travel. Therefore,
the statute in Zobel would not be declared an unconstitutional
abridgement of the right to travel.
In Hooper, New Mexico granted a tax exemption to Vietnam
veterans residing in the state before a specified date. Even though the
statute failed to directly deal with interstate travel, the Supreme Court
held it unconstitutional. Similar to the statute in Zobel, a tax exemption retroactively granted cannot directly affect interstate travel.
Vietnam veterans residing in another state would not be able to move
to New Mexico to take advantage of the exemption after the date required to establish residency. Those able to take advantage of the
statute may be discouraged from moving outside the state because
they would not want to forfeit the exemption. Again, the forfeiture of
a benefit only indirectly affects interstate travel.
Even if the analysis advanced in this Note salvages many of the
statutes held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in previous cases,
this fact should not lead one to believe that the rule allows states to
legislate without concern for the right to travel. As a privilege and
immunity, the right to travel prohibits states from enacting legislation
that directly deals with interstate travel and abridges the right by
39 This same reasoning would uphold statutes at issue in two other cases. See Sosna v.
Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1974) (upholding a one year residency requirement for instituting divorce
proceedings); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (challenging a state
statute requiring one year of residency before receiving free non-emergency medical care).
350 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
351 472 U.S. 612 (1985).
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erecting barriers to interstate movement or by treating interstate travelers differently from intrastate travelers. Crandall and Edwards
serve as examples of impermissible barriers to interstate movement.
Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper3 52 is another example of a
state abridging the right to travel. In Piper,New Hampshire limited
bar admissions to state residents. The Supreme Court held that the
practice of law was a fundamental right and states could not distinguish between residents and non-residents without violating the
Comity Clause. Under this Note's proposed test, New Hampshire's
limitation would still be an unconstitutional abridgement of the right
to travel. The limitation directly deals with interstate travel by prohibiting non-residents from entering the state and becoming admitted
to the bar. Attorneys may not visit New Hampshire to conduct legal
business because they will not be admitted to practice law in New
Hampshire. The way in which the limitation deals with interstate
travel illuminates the fact that the limitation discriminates against interstate travelers. Intrastate travelers are welcomed into bar admission, while interstate travelers are not. Accordingly, the interstate
travelers are unable to exercise their right to travel.
In reassessing the Supreme Court's right to travel cases under the
proffered rule, it should become clear that the proffered rule attempts
to strike a balance between state and individual rights. States have
the right to legislate in the absence of a constitutional prohibition.
Individuals have a right to travel. The proposed analysis allows states
to exercise their right to legislate so long as they do not abridge the
right as properly viewed and allow individuals the freedom to exercise their right to travel interstate.
CONCLUSION

In an early scene in The Big Lebowski,35 3 two men accost the
film's main character, the "Dude." One of the men interrogates the
Dude as to the whereabouts of money-which is not actually owed by
the Dude but by another with the same name-while repeatedly
forcing the Dude's head into a toilet. After withstanding numerous
dunkings in silence and peering into the toilet bowl again, the Dude
quips, "It's, uh, it's in there somewhere. Let me take another
look."354 Unfortunately, the Dude's attitude sums up the Supreme
Court's approach to the right to travel. The Court, with its figurative
head held over the Constitution, hastily concedes that the Constitution
protects the right; but in its haste to protect, the Court fails to put forth
a cogent rationale as to why any particular clause of the Constitution
352 470 U.S. 274 (1985).
353 THEBiG LEBOWSKI (Palygram 1998).
3M ad
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protects the right. At this point, it seems that with each new case-as
its head is again held over the Constitution-the Court offers a new
clause as the source of the right as it strikes down the challenged statute as unconstitutional. This is not the reasoned judgment to be expected from the Court entrusted with the role of "faithful guardian of
the Constitution. 355
Accordingly, the Court must reevaluate its right-to-travel jurisprudence, beginning with the notion that the right to travel--or any
unenumerated right-may or may not be protected by the Constitution. In so doing, the Court will realize that privileges and immunities of the Comity Clause and of the Fourteenth Amendment were
meant to protect the right to travel, among others. But the Court must
address the fact that the Privileges and Immunities Clause is shackled
and then kill Slaughter-House, thereby shedding that clause of the
limits imposed upon it. Only then can the right to travel be placed
within its appropriate constitutional provisions, the Comity Clause
and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Then, to protect the right to travel, an analysis fashioned from
the origins and meanings of the right's constitutional home can be
implemented. This Note has proposed such an analysis, one that is
faithful to the text of the Constitution, would be easier for courts to
apply than others employed or advocated, would clearly notify states
of impermissible statutes, and would better inform the citizenry of its
constitutional rights. If the Court fails to rework its right-to-travel
jurisprudence, then Justice Scalia will have been proven correct, and
the Court will have earned the epithet, "nine-headed Caesar."
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